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The Future of Insider Trading after Salman:
Perpetuation of a Flawed Analysis or a Return to
Basics
CHARLES W. MURDOCK†
In large part due to two poorly reasoned decisions by Justice Powell in the early 1980s, Chiarella v. U. S. and Dirks v.
SEC, the development of insider trading law has been constrained, enforcement has been hampered, and insider-trading
has grown to the point where hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake. Moreover, Chiarella and Dirks were inconsistent
with the Congressional policy that the purpose of the securities laws is to ensure a level playing field where one
participant does not have an undue advantage over another participant.
A Second Circuit decision, U.S. v. Newman unnecessarily extended Dirks, notwithstanding Congress’s caution to
constrain the Dirks decision to its unique set of facts. Newman reversed the conviction of hedge fund portfolio managers
who made millions of dollars by trading on inside information on the basis that they did not know the benefit that the
tippers who provided that information had received in connection with their tips. Newman further cast doubt on whether
a benefit can be relational, rather than pecuniary.
Recent insider trading prosecutions reflect the fact that insider trading today is big business. Hedge funds are under
intense pressure to get an “edge” to enhance their returns, even if it means resorting to a “black edge.” As Sheelah
Kolhatkar, the author of Black Edge, a three-year study of the skulduggery that inheres in much of the hedge fund
industry, noted the basic problem with Newman “is that it completely misunderstood the way the world actually works.”
For the Newman court, defendants’ lack of culpability stemmed from the fact that “Newman and Chiasson were several
steps removed from the corporate insiders and there was no evidence that either was aware of the source of the inside
information.”
The Newman court failed to realize that this is the way the game is played. The portfolio manager orders trades, which
make millions for the organization and indirectly for the analysts and others who feed information to the portfolio
manager. All of these people are aware of the risks of insider trading and, when a dark edge is employed, want to
obfuscate insider trading as much as possible. The key for the portfolio manager is to inform the analysts that he wants
the best possible information, but does not want to know how they get it.
Shortly after Newman, the Supreme Court decided Salman v. U.S., which involved a fairly pedestrian situation in which
one family member tipped another. However, the Supreme Court declined to adopt the requirement in Newman that there
must be something of a “pecuniary or valuable nature” in a gift to family or friends in order for the gift rationale in
insider trading to apply.
Salman was then followed by U.S. v. Martoma, where SAC Capital Advisors realized $80.3 million in gains and avoided
$194.6 million in losses by obtaining advance notice that the Alzheimer study was flawed. The portfolio manager who
obtained the information from a participant in the study received a $9 million bonus. Martoma, in first analyzing Salman,
opined that Salman in effect also rejected Newman’s requirement of a “meaningfully close personal relationship” in
order to use the gift approach. The Martoma court later amended its opinion and looked at the basis for requiring a
“meaningfully close personal relationship,” namely, that there must be evidence of “a relationship between the insider
and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to benefit the latter.”
This Article provides an extensive analysis of the history of insider trading, and the policies underlying the law, and
demonstrates that the pre-Chiarella/Dirks law was much more consistent with the Congressional policy of a level playing
field. Hopefully, Salman and Martoma reflect a more realistic approach to the law of insider trading. It is critical for
courts to understand the pressures to receive illegal information, the chain through which it travels, where it must end in
order to be operational, and the devices employed to disguise the illegal sources that are often used. Courts also need to
understand that much of the world operates on networking and relationships, and that people are motivated by factors
other than immediate pecuniary gain.

†

Professor and Loyola Faculty Scholar, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
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INTRODUCTION
The recent U.S. Supreme Court decision, Salman v. United States,1
generated headlines like “Supreme Court Sides with Prosecutors”2 and
“Supreme Court Sets Tough Insider Trading Rule,”3 suggesting that Salman
provided a substantial boost for the government in regulating insider trading.
However, Salman was a minimalist decision and, at first glance, seemed to do
little to define the scope of insider trading or to remedy or clarify the confusing
and illogical jurisprudence in this area. The Court relied upon what was
essentially an aside in Dirks v. Securities,4 a poorly reasoned decision that relied
upon the equally poorly-reasoned decision in Chiarella v. United States.5
However, Salman did repudiate the part of the United States v. Newman
holding that required that a tipper “must also receive something of a ‘pecuniary
or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or friends.”6
Building upon Salman’s repudiation of Newman, the Second Circuit in United
States v. Martoma also constrained the requirement in Newman that there must
be a “meaningfully close personal relationship” between the tipper and the
tippee in a “gift” situation by focusing upon the underlying basis for the personal
benefit requirement, namely, that there be either a quid pro quo or an intent to
benefit, and by taking a broad view of personal benefit, in contradistinction to
that taken by Newman. 7 The position by the Second Circuit in Martoma could
most likely have resulted in the conviction of the defendants in Newman.
To understand insider trading law and why the circuit courts in Newman
and Salman could issue arguably conflicting opinions, leading to the Supreme
Court’s decision in Salman, and also to understand why the Second Circuit
backed off from Newman in Martoma, one needs a historical and policy
perspective. This Article will first look at the reason why the securities laws
were enacted and the early, liberal view of insider trading.8 It will then examine
and critique the supposedly conservative but actually reactionary trilogy of
decisions in this area that the Supreme Court handed down in the 1980s,9 and
the aftermath of these decisions, including the dramatic uptick in insider

1. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
2. Adam Liptak, Supreme Court Sides with Prosecutors in Insider Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/06/business/dealbook/supreme-court-insider-trading.html.
3. Richard Wolf & Kevin McCoy, Supreme Court Sets Tough Insider Trading Rule, USA TODAY (Dec.
6, 2016), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2016/12/06/supreme-court-insider-trading/94567078/.
4. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
5. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
6. Salman, 137 S.Ct at 428 (quoting United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 452 (2014)).
7. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 68 (2d Cir. 2017), amended 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting
Newman, 773 F.3d at 452).
8. See Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of the Supreme Court’s Rule 10b-5 Jurisprudence: Protecting
Fraud at the Expense of Investors (Feb. 18, 2012) (unpublished paper) (on file with author).
9. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222; see also Dirks, 463 U.S. 646; Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19
(1987); Murdock, supra note 8.
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trading,10 the congressional response,11 and the relationship of the
jurisprudential
mischief
between
these
trilogies
to
the
Newman/Salman/Martoma conflict. This Article concludes that the “liberal”
approach of the 1960s would create no more ambiguity and confusion than the
course chosen by the Supreme Court in its decisions from the1980s. Moreover,
a liberal approach would be far more in line with the legislative policy
preferences reflected in the securities laws enacted by Congress after the market
excesses of the 1920s, and would stem the massive insider trading that followed
these later decisions.
From a policy perspective, Congress has clearly stated the critical
importance of fairness in our securities markets:
In order to raise the enormous sums of investment capital that will be needed
in the years ahead and to assure that that capital is properly allocated among
competing uses, these markets must continue to operate fairly and
efficiently.12

For the securities markets to operate “fairly and efficiently,” Congress has
recognized the following goals of the 1934 Securities Exchange Act:
The basic goals of the Exchange Act remain salutatory and unchallenged:
To provide fair and honest mechanisms for the pricing of securities, to assure
that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages
among investors, to ensure that securities can be purchased and sold at
economically efficient transaction costs, and to provide, to the maximum
degree practicable, markets that are open and orderly.13

The Supreme Court itself has recognized that history teaches us “how
essential it is that the highest ethical standards prevail in every facet of the
securities industry.”14 However, to revert to a sound approach regarding insider
trading, the Supreme Court will need to either abandon its personal benefit test
in assessing whether a tipper has “sinned,” or follow the lead of the Second
Circuit in Martoma that, in a situation where an insider makes a gift of material,
non-public inside information to anyone when the purpose is to enable the tippee
to trade, such conduct is illegal. If neither of these possibilities materialize, then
either the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) or Congress should adopt
a definition of insider trading akin to that proposed in the 1980s.

I. THE EARLY JURISPRUDENCE ON INSIDER TRADING
The leading insider trading case for a number of years was not a judicial
decision, but rather a 1961 SEC decision: In the Matter of Cady, Roberts & Co.15
10. JAMES B. STEWART, DEN OF THIEVES 16 (1991).
11. Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended
in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)); Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act Of
1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
12. H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.).
13. Id.
14. SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau. Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 186–87 (1963).
15. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
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The significance of Cady, Roberts is attested to by the fact that the majorities in
both Chiarella and Dirks relied upon the case as the leading one dealing with
insider trading, but grossly misinterpreted that decision.16 Congress also viewed
Cady, Roberts as seminal.17
A. THE CADY, ROBERTS DECISION—A SOUND RESULT BASED UPON SOUND
POLICY AND JURISPRUDENCE
Both the Chiarella and Dirks majority opinions misunderstood the
significance of the critically important facts of Cady, Roberts. First, Cady,
Roberts was a “bad news” case; that is, the triggering event was a decision by
the Board of Directors of Curtiss-Wright to cut the dividend.18 Such a negative
development would typically result in a market price drop, which would then
motivate unscrupulous “insiders” to sell their shares before the bad news became
public.19
On the other hand, a “good news” situation, such as a dividend increase, or
an incredible discovery of ore,20 could raise the market price of the stock. In a
“good news” situation, unscrupulous “insiders” could be expected to purchase
company stock. However, the only persons from whom the insider could
purchase stock would be existing shareholders to whom, 21 arguably, the insider
had a fiduciary duty.22
Contrariwise, when an insider sells stock, there is a high likelihood that
persons who previously did not hold the stock (that is, non-shareholders) would

16. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
17. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2287 (1983).
18. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 908–09.
19. See generally Diamond v. Oreamuno, 24 N.Y.2d 494 (1969).
20. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (1968).
21. See, e.g., Pappas v. Moss, 393 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1968) (in which insiders also purchased shares from
the corporation).
22. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419, 434 (1909) (holding that defendant director and owner of stock and
administrator general of the company had an obligation to make disclosures to the stockholder); Oliver v. Oliver,
118 Ga. 362, 368 (1903) (“If, however, the fact within the knowledge of the director is of a character calculated
to affect the selling price, and can, without detriment to the interest of the company, be imparted to the
shareholder, the director, before he buys, is bound to make a full disclosure. In a certain sense the information
is a quasi asset of the company, and the shareholder is as much entitled to the advantage of that sort of an asset
as to any other regularly entered on the list of the company’s holdings. If the officer should purposely conceal
from a stockholder information as to the existence of valuable property belonging to the company, and take
advantage of this concealment, the sale would necessarily be set aside.”); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 283 Mass. 358,
363 (1933) (“[W]here a director personally seeks a stockholder for the purpose of buying his shares without
making disclosure of material facts within his particular knowledge and not within the reach of the stockholder,
the transaction will be closely scrutinized and relief may be granted in appropriate instances.”) (holding that
defendants owed no duty to plaintiff shareholders because the identity of the sellers of the stock were unknown
and could not be readily ascertained by defendant directors).
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be among the purchasers.23 Under the common law, there was no recognized
duty of officers or directors to non-shareholders.24
This is highly significant because the individual defendant in Cady,
Roberts argued that “an insider’s responsibility is limited to existing
stockholders and that he has no special duties when sales of securities are made
to non-stockholders.”25 In rejecting this argument, the SEC stated that “[t]his
approach is too narrow. It ignores the plight of the buying public—wholly
unprotected from the misuse of special information.”26 The Court expanded
upon this policy concern by stating:
There is no valid reason why persons who purchase stock from an officer,
director or other person having the responsibilities of an ‘insider’ should not
have the same protection afforded by disclosure of special information as
persons who sell stock to them. Whatever distinctions may have existed at
common law based on the view that an officer or director may stand in a
fiduciary relationship to existing stockholders from whom he purchases but
not to members of the public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate
to introduce these into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the
securities acts.27

At this time, case law took the same position. In Gratz v. Claughton, Judge
Learned Hand, a highly regarded jurist, stated:
For many years a grave omission in our corporation law had been its
indifference to dealings of directors or other corporate officers in the shares
of their companies. When they bought shares, they came literally within the
conventional prohibitions of the law of trusts; yet the decisions were
strangely slack in so deciding. When they sold shares, it could indeed be
argued that they were not dealing with a beneficiary, but with one whom his
purchase made a beneficiary. That should not, however, have obscured the
fact that the director or officer assumed a fiduciary relation to the buyer by
the very sale; for it would be a sorry distinction to allow him to use the
advantage of his position to induce the buyer into the position of a
beneficiary, although he was forbidden to do so, once the buyer had become
one.28

Refusing to let common law concepts determine results under securities
laws makes preeminent sense because securities laws were enacted due to the
common law’s inability to ensure fair and orderly securities markets.29 The
purpose of the securities laws was to “ensure the fair and honest functioning of
impersonal national securities markets where common-law protections have
23. It is of course possible that an existing shareholder might increase his or her position.
24. Goodwin arguably determined that there is not a duty to shareholders in a publicly traded corporation
where an insider purchases stock. A fortiori, there would not be a duty to non-shareholders. Goodwin, 283 Mass.
at 361.
25. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 913 (1961).
26. Id.
27. Id. (third and fourth emphases added).
28. Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 1951).
29. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28; see also Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 248
(1980) (the purpose of the securities was to “ensure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal national
securities markets where common-law protections have proved inadequate.”) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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proved inadequate.”30 Congress itself stated that the purpose of securities laws
was “to assure that dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or
advantages among investors.”31 Professor Louis Loss, a noted scholar in the
securities field, asserted that Congress, in enacting the 1934 Securities Exchange
Act, sought to prevent inequitable and unfair practices and to ensure fairness in
securities transactions generally, whether conducted face-to-face, over-thecounter, or on an exchange.32 It makes little sense to rely upon common law
jurisprudence to interpret securities laws when such jurisprudence was, in effect,
rebuked by the enactment of the remedial jurisprudence embodied in the
securities laws.
Cady, Roberts was significant in two other aspects. First, it recognized that
the concept of “insider,” or one who has special duties under the securities laws,
was not limited to “officers, directors and control shareholders,” but includes
“those persons who are in a special relationship with a company and privy to its
internal affairs, and thereby suffer correlative duties in trading in its
securities.”33 The Court pejoratively added that “[i]ntimacy demands restraint
less the uninformed be exploited.”34
The SEC opinion in Cady, Roberts proposed the following test to
determine the persons upon whom a special obligation is imposed, which
requires: (1) “the existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly,
to information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone,” and (2) “the inherent unfairness involved where
a party takes advantage of such information knowing it is unavailable to those
with whom he is dealing.”35
Second, and arguably more important, in the context of tipper/tippee, the
tipper in Cady, Roberts was guiltless because he breached neither a common law
duty, nor any special obligation imposed by the securities laws. Cowden, who
was a director of Curtiss-Wright, was present at a board meeting in which a
dividend cut was approved. The secretary of the company was instructed to
make the appropriate disclosures to Dow Jones and the New York Stock
Exchange and left the room to do so. Sometime later, the board took a break and
it was then that Cowden telephoned Gintel, his colleague at Cady, Roberts, and
mentioned the dividend cut. 36
The Cady, Roberts opinion noted that, “there was no evidence of a
preconceived plan whereby Cowden was to ‘leak’ advance information
[to] . . . Gintel,” and that “the evidence points to the conclusion that Cowden
probably assumed, without thinking about it, that the dividend action was

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.)).
LOUIS LOSS, SECURITIES REGULATION 1455–56 (2d ed. 1961).
In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 917.
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already a matter of public information and further that he called registrant’s
office to find out the effect of the dividend news upon the market.”37
Thus, in Cady, Roberts, the tipper did not sin, that is, receive any sort of
pecuniary benefit. Nonetheless, the tippee was found to have violated Rule 10b5.38 Contrast this approach to that taken by the Supreme Court in Dirks, where
the Court held that a tippee does not “sin” unless the tipper sins, and that the
tipper only sins when he or she obtains a pecuniary or other benefit.39
B. TEXAS GULF SULPHUR—QUESTIONABLE ANALYSIS, BUT SOUND POLICY
The next significant decision in the development of insider trading was the
Second Circuit’s opinion in Texas Gulf Sulphur.40 The case was arguably the
apogee of the judicial expansion of Rule 10b-5 and much of its sloppy semantics
have been rejected today.41 Its most problematic language was the use of the
phrase “disclose or abstain,”42 instead of the more accurate phraseology,
“abstain until disclosable.” In almost every situation in which the phrase
“disclose or abstain” has been used, suggesting that the insider has an option,
there is invariably an obligation not to disclose; thus, there is not an option for
alternative courses of action, but rather a duty not to trade while the information
remains nonpublic. Nonetheless, Texas Gulf Sulfur has been cited positively by
Congress and its result on the insider trading aspect is sound and would be
followed today. 43
Texas Gulf Sulphur was actually a two-act play. The first act covered the
period from November 12 to April 16, which involved insider trading by
employees and officers of Texas Gulf Sulphur.44 The second act covered the
period from April 12 through April 16 and involved the company’s disclosure
obligations under the securities laws.45

37. Id. at 908.
38. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2011).
39. See infra Subpart II.B.
40. SEC. v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
41. In discussing materiality, the court vacillated between using the word “may” and “would,” and
“possible” versus “probable.” Id. at 848–50. (“[T]he materiality of facts is to be assessed solely by measuring
the effect the knowledge of the facts would have upon prudent or conservative investors . . . Thus, material facts
include not only information disclosing the earnings and distributions of a company but also those facts which
affect the probable future of the company and those which may affect the desire of investors to buy, sell, or hold
the company’s securities.”) Id. at 849. The Supreme Court, in TSC Indus. v. Northway, opted for the
would/probable standard as opposed to the might/possible standard. 426 U.S. 438 (1976). With respect to
scienter, the standard for liability in an SEC enforcement proceeding was merely whether the press release issued
by the Corporation “resulted from a lack of due diligence.” Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d. at 863. This is, in
effect, a negligence standard, whereas the Supreme Court, in Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, required some degree
of intentionality. 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Later, this has been interpreted as a recklessness standard. McLean v.
Alexander, 599 F.2d 1190 (3d Cir. 1979).
42. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 848.
43. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2287 (1983).
44. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 841.
45. Id. at 857–64.
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As a result of drilling operations in Timmins, Ontario, Canada, the
company raised a core of ore that indicated a substantial, if not extraordinary,
field of valuable metals.46 However, management wanted to verify the mineral
find with additional testing and acquire additional mineral leases in the area.47
Drilling was suspended while the company obtained more definitive analyses
and mineral leases.48 The employees who were aware of the find were instructed
not to disclose it, not even to other employees and officers of the company.49
Nevertheless, several employees and officers bought Texas Gulf Sulphur
stock during this period and the first act dealt with their liability for the alleged
insider trading. Drilling was resumed on March 31, 1964.50 An arguably
misleading press release was issued on April 12, 1964,51 and the second act
ended on April 16, 1964, when Texas Gulf Sulphur issued a corrective press
release.52
The individual defendants either purchased Texas Gulf Sulphur’s stock, or
called or tipped to others who did. Citing Cady, Roberts, the court set forth the
following standard by which the individual defendants would be judged:
The essence of the Rule is that anyone who, trading for his own account in
the securities of a corporation has ‘access, directly or indirectly, to
information intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for
the personal benefit of anyone’ may not take ‘advantage of such information
knowing it is unavailable to those with whom he is dealing,’ i.e., the investing
public.53

The court added the following, which became known as the “disclose or
abstain” rule:
Thus, anyone in possession of material inside information must either
disclose it to the investing public, or, if he is disabled from disclosing it in
order to protect a corporate confidence, or he chooses not to do so, must
abstain from trading in or recommending the securities concerned while such
inside information remains undisclosed.54

46. Id. at 843.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 843.
50. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d. at 844.
51. The press release stated that reports and rumors of a substantial copper discovery were exaggerated by
people not connected with Texas Gulf Sulphur (TGS) and that “[t]he work done to date has not been sufficient
to reach definite conclusions and any statement as to size and grade of ore would be premature and possibly
misleading.” Id. at 845. The trial court called the press release “gloomy or incomplete.” Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co.,
258 F. Supp. 262, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that “the release was issued
in a manner reasonably calculated to affect the market price of TGS stock and influence the investing public”
and remanded to the district court to determine whether the release was misleading such that the court should
issue an injunction against TGS. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d at 864.
52. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d. at 850 n.13. It’s unclear why TGS felt the need to issue the April 12
release and did not simply wait four days. Alternatively, TGS could have avoided a lot of trouble by issuing the
April 16 release on the 12th, instead of the gloomy one.
53. Id. at 848.
54. Id. (emphasis added).
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The court recognized that disclosure may be “forbidden by the legitimate
corporate objective of acquiring options to purchase the land surrounding the
exploration site.”55 In such a situation, “if the information was, as the SEC
contends, material, its possessors should have kept out of the market until
disclosure was accomplished.”56 Consequently, as asserted above, the Texas
Gulf Sulfur court should have described the obligation as “abstain until
disclosable.” This latter phrasing would not have supported the plaintiff’s later
argument that once the insider did not abstain, he or she had the obligation to
disclose, and the failure to disclose caused plaintiffs’ loss.57
While the language throughout the Texas Gulf Sulfur opinion could have
been more precise, the legal standard was clear and unambiguous: if you receive
material, non-public information because your “access” to information intended
to be available only for a corporate purpose, you may not trade until such
information is disclosed to other potential investors. This standard comports
with the purpose of the securities laws, as stated by Congress, “to ensure that
dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among
investors.”58 It also reflected the policy that the SEC later promulgated in
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD),59 requiring prompt disclosure of inside
information that is intentionally or inadvertently selectively transmitted.
The Texas Gulf Sulphur standard would have foreclosed the subsequent
argument about whether the source of information received a “benefit” in
transmitting information. If the trader has scienter—that is, knows that the
information is non-public—it is immaterial from a “fairness in trading”
perspective whether the source of information “misappropriated” it,60 sold it,61
or gifted it.62 If the tipper was duped into conveying the information,63 the issue
should be the scienter of the tippee, not the benefit of the tipper and the tippee,
as in Cady, Roberts, which would violate the securities laws irrespective of the
“sin,” or lack thereof, by the tipper.
C. EARLY OPPOSITION TO INSIDER TRADING ENFORCEMENT
The foregoing discussion is not to suggest that there was not some
opposition to the early liberal development of insider trading. Henry Manne,
originally at the University of Rochester and later the Dean of George Mason
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. See Mitchell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90, 106 (10th Cir. 1971) (awarding damages in the
amount that it would have taken a reasonable person to reinvest in the market after the timely release of
information in an action for recovery after investors sold stock as a result of a misleading press release).
58. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 248 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (quoting H.R. REP. NO.
98-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.).
59. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2012).
60. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 241.
61. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27–28 (1987); PAULE CONSTANT, TRADING SECRETS (Betsy
Wing trans., Univ. of Neb. Press 2001).
62. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 429 (2016).
63. Elkind v. Liggett & Myers, Inc., 635 F.2d 156, 167–68 (2d Cir. 1980).
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Law School,64 is sometimes regarded as the father of law and economics,65 and
was an aggressive critic of insider trading enforcement.66 According to Professor
Manne, insider trading is a victimless crime, moves the market in the right
direction, and constitutes a sound way to reward executives for outstanding
performance.67 While some economists shared his view, this was definitely a
minority position.68
First of all, Professor Manne is correct that insider trading pushes the
market in the right direction. If an insider buys on positive information (good
news) prior to the disclosure of such information, the additional buying pressure
would move the price of the stock upward toward where it should be after the
market absorbs the “good news.” Similarly, when an insider sells prior to the
disclosure of adverse information (bad news), increasing the supply of securities
offered for sale will decrease the price of the stock, and later disclosure will
move the price toward a lower equilibrium.
For example, the stock in Curtiss-Wright, the company whose stock was
traded in the Cady, Roberts case, was trending around 40 before the dividend
cut was announced. Trading in the stock was suspended after the announcement
because of the large number of sell orders and, after trading was resumed, the
stock closed at just below 35.69 However, moving the market in the right
direction is not a justification for introducing inherent unfairness into the trading
system.
According to Professor Manne, when the insider buys on undisclosed
positive information, the seller on the other side of the transaction is advantaged
because the purchase by the insider raises the price of the stock and the seller
gets a higher price than would otherwise be the case. As a rough illustration, if
a specialist or market maker were quoting 40 bid, 40½ asked, a seller at that
point would receive 40. However, if the insider intervened to buy, the insider
would buy at 40½, which could lead to a rise in the market to 40½ bid, 41 asked.
The seller would then receive 40½, instead of 40.

64. Known today as the Antonin Scalia Law School.
65. Henry G. Manne, ’52, 1928-2015, UNIV. OF CHI. L. SCH., https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/henryg-manne-52-1928-2015 (last visited July 27, 2019).
66. Henry G. Manne, Insider Trading and Property Rights in New Information, 4 CATO J. 933 (1985).
67. Id.
68. The Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988 states:
A modest number of economists and academics defend the practice of insider trading as
promoting an efficient market. Some free market economists even favor legalizing insider trading.
They argue that the faster the market price reflects the nonpublic information, the more smoothly the
market functions. But the far greater number of commentators support efforts to curb insider trading,
viewing such efforts as crucial to the capital formation process that depends on investor confidence
in the fairness and integrity of our securities markets. Insider trading damages the legitimacy of the
capital market and diminishes the public’s faith.
H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 6045 (1988). When I was enrolled in his Law & Economics professional
program at Dartmouth, I offered to debate him on these issues, but he never responded. While it might be
unfair to do this postmortem, his position is both simplistic and unsound.
69. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908–10 (1961).
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The fallacy in the argument that no one is injured from insider trading is
that it assumes that any injury, if there be one, must be to the person on the
opposite side of the transaction. This is a situation that would exist in a face-toface transaction. For example, in Kardon v. National Gypsum,70 two brothers
bought stock at a low price without disclosing the favorable impending sale of
assets, knowing of the opportunity to sell the assets of the company at a favorable
price. Thus, the party on the other side was the injured one.
But with respect to a publicly traded stock, numerous investors may be
trading at the same time and much of their stock would likely be held in street
name, thus rendering it difficult to determine who on the other side of the
transaction might be injured. Moreover, there is a serious problem with
causation, in that the decision by the person on the other side of the transaction
to trade could be based upon a multitude of factors.
However, paradoxically, in the public markets, the persons injured by the
insider’s trading arguably are the persons on the same side of the market. In a
bad news situation, such as in Cady, Roberts, the insider always sells at a price
that is higher than subsequent sellers receive after the adverse information is
disclosed. Conversely, in a “good news” situation, the insider always buys ahead
of the market, and the price the insider pays will be lower than the price after
disclosure of the positive information. Unfortunately, this reality does not easily
translate into a computation of damages for the sellers or buyers who come to
the market after the insider trades.
Consequently, a private cause of action for insider trading in impersonal
public markets is arguably neither feasible nor realistic and, consequently,
enforcement falls to the U.S. Attorneys and the SEC in criminal and enforcement
proceedings.71
The argument that insider trading is a form of executive compensation also
fails. It is predicated on the notion that a rise in the price of stock reflects the
quality of management. While that may be true in some instances, history has
shown that there often is a negative correlation between a rise in stock prices
and the quality of management. There are many instances of management
hyping the price of the stock, bailing out, and leaving other shareholders to bear
the subsequent drop in price.72
Prescinding fraud situations, consider the situation of a corporation with
three divisions, two of which are expecting an exceptional improvement in
earnings, while a third division is poorly managed and has no earnings growth.
The overall effect, companywide, is a substantial increase in the earnings of the
70. 73 F. Supp. 798 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
71. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 432 (1964) (“Private enforcement of proxy rules provides a
necessary supplement to Commission action. . . . The Commission advises that it examines over 2,000 proxy
statements annually and each of them must be necessarily expedited. Time does not permit an independent
examination of the facts set out in the proxy material and this results in the Commission’s acceptance of the
representations contained therein at their face value.”).
72. Charles W. Murdock, The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and Particularity: Why Are Some
Courts in an Alternate Universe?, 45 LOY. UNIV. CHI. L.J. 615 (2014).
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company. Assume that the chief operating officers of each division are privy to
the company’s financial information. If all three trade ahead of the release of
earnings, all three will profit handsomely, but not even Professor Manne could
argue that the poor manager deserved the benefits of his insider trading.
Moreover, even Justice Powell, who wrote the restrictive opinions in Chiarella
and Dirks, acknowledged that “[a] significant purpose of the Exchange Act was
to eliminate the idea that use of inside information for personal advantage was a
normal emolument of corporate office.”73
The situation would be all the more egregious in a bad news situation
where all three executives are performing poorly, but liquidate their holdings
before disclosure of the poor earnings and avoid a substantial loss.74
Another criticism of the liberal development of insider trading in private
damages flowed from the adoption of the “disclose or abstain” mantra in Texas
Gulf Sulphur by other federal courts in private actions.75 Under the “disclose or
abstain” mantra, since the insider did not abstain, plaintiffs argued that he
therefore had an obligation to disclose and, that by not disclosing, the insider
caused injury to the other investors who traded in the market without the benefit
of the undisclosed information.76 Texas Gulf Sulphur was a “good news” case:
when the insider bought at 29 without disclosing the extraordinary mineral find,
sellers in the market would assert he or she would not have sold at 29, but rather
at a price of 40, to which the stock rose after disclosure.77
It soon became apparent that this theory of liability could have “draconian”
consequences.78 In Fridrich, two sets of plaintiffs brought suit against a
defendant who purchased stock with knowledge of an impending merger that
would increase the value of the company stock.79 One set of plaintiffs, Woosley,
purchased their stock in the company in 1967.80 The defendant, Bradford,
purchased 1225 shares of stock on April 27, 1972.81 The other set of plaintiffs,
Fridrich, purchased stock in May 1972.82 Both sets of plaintiffs sold in June 1972
at a small profit, while Bradford sold his shares on July 27, 1972, realizing a
profit of $13,000 on the transaction.83
The district court held that the plaintiffs were entitled to damages during
the period of nondisclosure measured by “[t]he highest bid value reached by Old
73. Dirks v. SEC., 463 U.S. 646, 654 n.10 (1983) (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C., at 912, n.15).
74. See Diamond v. Oreamuno, 248 N.E.2d 910 (N.Y. 1969).
75. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
76. Id. at 95–96 (“Reynolds, Mitchell and the Stouts testified that they sold their TGS stock after hearing
of the April 12th release but before becoming aware of the April 16th release. . . . Later that afternoon he learned
of the favorable TGS report. He testified that had he known of the K-55-1 core results he would have doubled
his holdings.”).
77. Id. at 103 (explaining these rises in price and their effect on the market).
78. Fridrich v. Bradford, 542 F.2d 307, 309 (6th Cir. 1976).
79. Id. at 310.
80. Id. at 311.
81. Id. at 308.
82. Id. at 311.
83. Id. at 308.
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Line stock within a period of 20 days following the SEC’s [disclosure] action on
November 10, 1972, disclosing the defendants’ wrongful conduct.”84
Consequently, Bradford, who would realize a profit of only $13,000, was
nevertheless jointly and severally liable for a draconian judgment of
$361,186.75.85
In beginning its analysis, the Sixth Circuit recognized that “[f]ew early
cases brought under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 dealt with non-disclosure by
insiders trading in the open market. Development of the law in this area is largely
traceable to the “abstain or disclose rule” developed in SEC v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur.”86 The Sixth Circuit also recognized that some courts had interpreted
the “disclose or abstain” rule to require that once the insider traded, the insider
had an obligation to disclose and a breach of that duty could give rise to a private
cause of action without any more causation necessary.87 In other words, it was
the act of trading by the insider that supplied the necessary causation.
However, the Sixth Circuit did not accept that approach to causation:
We conclude that upon the facts of this case defendants’ conduct caused no
injury to plaintiffs and the judgment of the district court must be reversed. It
is undisputed that defendants did not purchase any shares of stock from
plaintiffs, and that defendants’ acts of trading in no way affected plaintiffs’
decision to sell.88

In focusing upon causation, the court stated that “[d]efendants’ trading did
not alter plaintiffs’ expectations when they sold their stock, and in no way
influenced plaintiffs’ trading decision.”89 Consequently, “defendants’ act of
trading with third persons was not causally connected with any claimed loss by
plaintiffs who traded on the impersonal market and who were otherwise
unaffected by the wrongful acts of the insider.”90
The logic of the Sixth Circuit is unassailable. Plaintiffs in Fridrich could
have sold for many reasons: to close out a profit, to generate liquidity to pay for
college tuition, or to diversify their holdings. The defendant had an obligation
not to disclose, but this duty ran to the corporation. In fact, absent the law of
insider trading, the disclosure obligation of either the insider or the corporation
is limited under securities laws.91

84. Id. at 313.
85. Id. at 308.
86. Id. at 314 (footnote omitted).
87. Id. at 317.
88. Id. at 318.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 318–19.
91. Most of the litigation regarding disclosure involves not whether to disclose, but rather, whether the
disclosure is false or misleading. Charles W. Murdock, The Significance and Impact of Price Distortion in the
Fraud-on-the-Market Theory After Halliburton II, 46 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 551, 577 (2015). 15 U.S.C. § 78l(a)–(b)
(2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78m (2012); 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)–(c) (2012); Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988).
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II. THE SUPREME COURT’S 1980S MISADVENTURES IN INSIDER TRADING
The confusion and uncertainty in the present state of the law on insider
trading is illustrated by the colloquy at oral argument in the current case of
Salman v. United States.92 Both sides relied upon Dirks and Chiarella, the two
poorly reasoned cases that marked the Supreme Court’s turn from conservative
to reactionary. If the foundation upon which a body of law is based is faulty,
then the jurisprudence that follows will be equally flawed.
I now turn to the flawed reasoning embodied in the trilogy of insider
trading decisions in the early 1980s, including Chiarella,93 Dirks,94 and
Carpenter,95 which dramatically changed the course of insider trading
enforcement, led to an explosion in insider trading,96 and triggered the enactment
of the Insider Trading Sanctions Act in 1984 (ITSA)97 and the Insider Trading
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act in 1988 (ITSFEA).98 Parenthetically, any
reference to the Congressional response to the decisions is noticeably absent in
subsequent Supreme Court decisions.
A. THE CHIARELLA DECISION—INTRODUCTION OF COMMON LAW DUTY
As stated above, both the defendant and government in Salman relied upon
Chiarella and Dirks, thus illustrating that the “rules” set forth in these cases are
not as clear and logical as supporters have argued.99 Chiarella marked a radical
departure from existing law, and Dirks made bad law worse. So, let us begin
with Chiarella.
Chiarella worked for a financial printer, Pandich Press, and, in the days
before computers (if anyone can remember that far back), type would be sent
before the tender offer, with the names of the bidder and target left blank, as well
as other clearly identifying material.100 The night before the bid was to be made,
the “blanks” would be filled in and the next morning, the bid would be
publicized.101 Chiarella was sufficiently astute to discern the identity of the
target, purchase the target stock at the pre-bid price, and make a substantial profit
after the stock price rose when the bid was announced.102

92. 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
93. 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
94. 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
95. 484 U.S. 19 (1987).
96. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2287 (1983); H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 6044 (1988).
97. Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended
in scattered subsections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1988)).
98. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
99. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 426–29 (2016).
100. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
101. Id.
102. Id.
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If the purpose of the law was to reward industriousness, as Professor
Manne has suggested,103 Chiarella certainly was deserving. Unlike the
defendants in Newman and Salman, Chiarella’s profits came as a result of some
creative effort on his part.104 Contrariwise, the defendants in Newman and
Salman were simply leeches, benefiting from the ill-gained knowledge of others.
However, Chief Justice Burger, a law and order conservative,105 was not
impressed with Chiarella’s industriousness in his dissenting opinion and
chastised Chiarella as follows:
[T]he evidence shows beyond all doubt that Chiarella, working literally in
the shadows of the warning signs in the printshop, misappropriated—stole to
put it bluntly—valuable nonpublic information entrusted to him in the utmost
confidence. He then exploited his ill-gotten informational advantage by
purchasing securities in the market. In my view, such conduct plainly
violates § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5. Accordingly, I would affirm the judgment
of the Court of Appeals.106

Chiarella was tried by the U.S. Attorney essentially for violating the
“disclose or abstain” duty articulated in Texas Gulf Sulphur. As stated above,
this formulation by the Texas Gulf Sulphur court has always been problematic
because, as here, Chiarella was under a duty not to disclose because he clearly
owed a duty of confidentiality to his employer.
Moreover, the information he possessed was not “company specific”
information relating to the “financials” of the bidder to whom he owed a duty of
confidentiality, but rather “market information,” namely the plan of the bidder
to make a forthcoming tender offer. Thus, the situation differed from the
“traditional” insider trading situation where a corporate insider used company
specific information and, in a “good news” situation, bought from existing
shareholders to whom he may have had a common law fiduciary duty. Under the
common law, Chiarella did not have a fiduciary duty to the persons trading on
the other side of his transactions, namely, the shareholders of the target
company.
Dealing with this somewhat unique situation in a point in time when tender
offers were not as prevalent as today, the majority believed that it could not
affirm Chiarella’s conviction without recognizing a duty to the market as a
whole.

103. Manne, supra note 66, at 935–36.
104. Chiarella’s attorney acknowledged the following in closing argument:
Let me say right up front, too, Mr. Chiarella got on the stand and he conceded, he said candidly, “I
used clues I got while I was at work. I looked at these various documents and I deciphered them and
I decoded them and I used that information as a basis for purchasing stock.” There is no question
about that. We don’t have to go through a hullabaloo about that. It is something he concedes. There
is no mystery about that.
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 244–45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
105. I am not necessarily a fan of Chief Justice Burger. He fell asleep on me during my oral argument in
Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985).
106. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 245 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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This is where the Court ran amuck. As stated earlier,107 the securities laws
were enacted because the common law was inadequate.108 However, the Court
now turned to the common law to determine whether there is a violation of the
federal securities laws. Long ago, a justice who advocated judicial restraint
nevertheless observed, in discussing disclosure obligations under the securities
laws, that where federal rights are involved, federal courts can fashion a federal
common law.109 Unfortunately, the Rehnquist and Roberts courts have rejected
looking to a federal common law to enforce federal rights on the basis that this
is judicial activism.110 Paradoxically, these courts themselves have engaged in
unparalleled judicial activism.111
The lack of judicial craftsmanship in Chiarella is illustrated by the fact that
the Court cited Cady, Roberts to support its position that a common law duty
must be violated before an insider violates Rule 10b-5.112 In fact, Cady, Roberts
held just the opposite. As stated above, Cady, Roberts was a “bad news”
situation where the price was likely to go down, so the insider sold. Gintel, the
colleague of the Curtiss-Wright director who passed the information to him,
argued that he had no fiduciary duty to those to whom he sold because they were
non-shareholders.113 The Cady, Roberts opinion made short shrift of this
argument by stating:
“Whatever distinctions may have existed at common law . . . that an
officer or director may stand in a fiduciary relationship to existing
stockholders from whom he purchases but not to members of the
public to whom he sells, it is clearly not appropriate to introduce these
into the broader anti-fraud concepts embodied in the securities
acts.”114
Thus, in no way does Cady, Roberts stand for the proposition that the evil in
insider trading devolves from common law principles.
Assuming, arguendo, the need to find a duty, Chief Justice Burger would
find such a duty from the fact that the information was illicitly obtained. Justice
Burger acknowledged that, in an arm’s-length transaction between two parties,
the rule is that there is not normally an obligation to disclose. The rationale for

107. See supra text following note 30.
108. See supra text at notes 24–27; see also Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 248 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(discussing that the purpose of the securities laws is “to ensure the fair and honest functioning of impersonal
national securities markets where common-law protections have proved inadequate”).
109. J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 434 (1964) (“[I]t ‘is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion
federal law where federal rights are concerned.’” (quoting Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457
(1957)). Justice Clark also stated, “Private enforcement of the proxy rules provides a necessary supplement to
Commission action.” Id. at 432.
110. See Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 576–79 (1979).
111. Consider, for example, Central Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511 U.S. 164 (1994),
where the court, on its own motion, requested the parties to brief a different issue than the parties had brought
before the court. It then overturned the uniform decisions of the Circuit Courts that defendants could aid and
abet a violation of Rule 10b-5. Id. at 177–78.
112. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 227–29.
113. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908–09 (1961).
114. Id. at 913–14.
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this is that a person in a securities transaction should get the benefit of his or her
“hard work, careful analysis, and astute forecasting.”115 However, the rationale
for this rule fails “when an informational advantage is obtained, not by superior
experience, foresight, or industry, but by some unlawful means.”116 Since
Chiarella did not disclose—indeed, he had a duty not to disclose—he had an
absolute obligation to abstain and his failure to do so was illegal.
Recall that Chiarella was a criminal case. The duty in criminal law is not
to anyone in particular—it is a duty to obey the law which the legislature has
adopted for the benefit of all. While there may be some who are especially
benefited by the law, establishment of such a benefit is not a prerequisite to a
determination that the law has been violated. The prohibition against driving
through a red light is for the especial benefit of pedestrians and drivers in crosstraffic. One who was hit by someone who runs a red light can establish
negligence by showing that the defendant violated the law.117 However, the
driver who ignores a red light is not exculpated by the fact that he did not hit
anyone. The statute was violated, and the act is illegal irrespective of whether
anyone is injured. This is the approach that the majority in Chiarella should have
taken. Focusing upon whether there is a duty to some particular person or group
of persons misses the point.
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court began its analysis by improperly
framing the issue. According to the Court, the issue was “whether a person who
learns from the confidential documents of one corporation that it is planning an
attempt to secure control of a second corporation violates § 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 if he fails to disclose the impending takeover
before trading in the target company’s securities.”118
Based upon the Cady, Roberts decision, which Justice Powell later
characterized as a “seminal” case in Dirks,119 Justice Powell should have stated
the issue to be whether a person with material non-public information, which the
person knows is “intended to be available only for a corporate purpose and not
for the personal benefit of anyone,” violates Rule 10b-5 by trading on the basis
of that information before it is disclosed to the public.120
The Court continued its analysis by stating that the “case concerns the legal
effect of the petitioner’s silence.”121 Again, this misstates the issue. This is not a
silence case similar to that in the Affiliated Ute case.122 This case does not
115. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
116. Id. (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: STATUTORY VIOLATIONS AS NEGLIGENCE PER SE § 14 (AM.
LAW INST. 2010).
118. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
119. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653 (1983).
120. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 SEC 907, 912 (1961).
121. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226.
122. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128 (1972). The securities claim arose from the
mixed-blood members being compelled to deal with the First Security Bank of Utah regarding the sale of their
shares per agreement with the Ute Development Corporation (UDC). Id. at 145. The mixed-bloods began selling
their shares through the bank to nonmembers, including two of the bank managers, at prices lower than the price
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involve Chiarella’s failure to speak, but rather Chiarella’s actions, namely,
trading on the basis of material, non-public information. Once again, if Cady,
Roberts is seminal, Cady, Roberts focused not upon silence by Gintel, the tippee,
but rather, his trading in a situation that involved an unfair advantage because of
the premature disclosure of material information to him.123
When you start down the wrong path, it is not surprising that you end up in
the wrong place. As Yogi Berra once said, “You’ve got to be very careful if you
don’t know where you are going because you might not get there.”124
Since Chiarella did not disclose the confidential information before
trading, the majority allowed itself to be euchred by the faulty language in Texas
Gulf Sulfur that insiders have an obligation to disclose or abstain. Since he did
not abstain, under this flawed phraseology, he had a duty to disclose and, since
he did not disclose, the Court treated the case as a silence case.125
In so doing, the Court recognized, properly so, that silence is actionable
only when there is a duty to disclose. But, clearly, Chiarella did not have a duty
to disclose stemming from his employment relationship. To the contrary, he had
a duty to maintain confidentiality. The only other relationship that Chiarella had
was a buyer/seller relationship with the shareholders of the target corporation
from whom he bought.
According to the majority, “[p]etitioner’s use of . . . [the forthcoming
tender offer] was not a fraud under § 10(b) unless he was subject to an
affirmative duty to disclose it before trading.”126 The Court could see no basis
upon which posit such a duty:
Second, the element required to make silence fraudulent—a duty to
disclose—is absent in this case. No duty could arise from petitioner’s
relationship with the sellers of the target company’s securities, for petitioner
had no prior dealings with them. He was not their agent, he was not a
fiduciary, he was not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence. He was, in fact, a complete stranger who dealt with the sellers
only through impersonal market transactions.127

Consequently, the Court concluded:
We cannot affirm petitioner’s conviction without recognizing a general duty
between all participants in market transactions to forgo actions based on
that the shares were eventually sold for between nonmembers. Id. at 146–47. The mixed-blood members then
brought suit against the United States, the bank managers, and the bank. Id. at 140. As to the United States, the
Court found that as federal termination of the shares was complete, the United States had no liability for failure
to restrain sale. Id. at 150. The Court also found the bank managers committed fraud in that they planned to
entice the mixed-bloods to sell their shares without disclosing facts that would influence their decision to sell.
Id. at 153. The Court found that the bank managers were market makers, and had a duty to disclose to the sellers
that they would benefit from any such sales of shares. Id. The Court lastly found that the Bank was coextensive
with that of its managers. Id. at 154.
123. See Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. at 915.
124. James Jahnke, Yogi Berra’s 50 Greatest Quotes, DET. FREE PRESS, (Sept. 23, 2015),
https://www.freep.com/story/sports/mlb/2015/09/23/yogi-berra-quotes-isms/72669094/.
125. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 226.
126. Id. at 231.
127. Id. at 232–33.
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material, nonpublic information. Formulation of such a broad duty, which
departs radically from the established doctrine that duty arises from a specific
relationship between two parties . . . should not be undertaken absent some
explicit evidence of congressional intent.128

More succinctly: “We hold that a duty to disclose under § 10(b) does not
arise from the mere possession of nonpublic market information.”129 The Court
opined that a contrary result “would be inconsistent with the careful plan that
Congress has enacted for the regulation of the securities markets.”130
This was a remarkable piece of legerdemain by Justice Powell, an
experienced corporate lawyer, who was undoubtedly very familiar with the
securities laws and their history.
To support the statement that a contrary result would be inconsistent with
the careful plan that Congress had enacted for the regulation of the securities
markets, Justice Powell relied upon the Williams Act,131 and the SEC’s
regulation of “parking.”132 According to the Court, the Williams Act merely
limits “but does not completely prohibit a tender offeror’s purchases of target
corporation stock before public announcement of the offer.”133 The Court
intellectualized from this legislation that Congress does not mind some insider
trading. What the Court failed to recognize was that the bidder utilized its own
information, not someone else’s, by purchasing the stock of the target
corporation. As suggested by the Court, instead of empowering the bidder to do
something that it otherwise could not do, the Williams Act actually constrains
the bidder by limiting the time period during which it can use its own
information to purchase stock.
Similarly, the argument that using section 14(e) of the 1934 Securities
Exchange Act,134 instead of section 10(b),135 indicates that Rule 10b-5,
promulgated pursuant to section 10(b), somehow indicates that Congress does
not believe in parity-of-information is fallacious. This is a non sequitur. The SEC
promulgated a rule against warehousing and tender offers under section 14(e),
rather than section 10(b) because, in the first place, section 14 is totally focused
upon tender offers. In addition, in section 14, Congress explicitly gave the SEC
the authority not just to define wrongful conduct, as in section 10(b), but also to
“prescribe means reasonably designed to prevent” fraudulent acts.136 In other
words, the scope of SEC authority under section 14 is greater than under section

128. Id. at 233.
129. Id. at 235.
130. Id.
131. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2012).
132. United States v. Bilzerian, 926 F.2d 1285, 1290 (2d. Cir. 1991) (“‘Parking’ refers to a transaction in
which a broker-dealer buys stock from a customer with the understanding that the customer will buy stock back
at a later date for the purchase price plus interest and commissions.”).
133. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 233.
134. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a)–(c) (2012).
135. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78j (West 2015).
136. Id. § 78n(e) (West 2015).
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10. In promulgating a rule, it is wise for an administrative body to use its
broadest legislative authorization.
Consequently, the fact that the SEC promulgated a rule against
warehousing and tender offers under section 14, which is focused upon tender
offers and provides a broad grant of SEC authority, says nothing at all about the
scope of Rule 10b-5. Unfortunately, Justice Powell, a former corporate lawyer,
used his broad knowledge of corporate law to muddy the waters by coming up
with analogies that superficially support his position, but are actually
irrelevant.137
The outcome-determinative nature of Justice Powell’s analysis is most
clearly indicated by its lack of reference to clearly stated congressional policy.
In recounting the necessity for regulation, Congress explicitly stated in section
2 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that one of the purposes was “to insure
the maintenance of fair and honest markets” in securities transactions.138 Later,
in connection with the massive 1975 amendments creating a national market
system, the joint conference report stated that the “basic goals of the Exchange
Act remain salutatory and unchallenged,” including the need “to assure that
dealing in securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among
investors.”139
While I quarrel with the sophistry utilized by Justice Powell, the U.S.
Attorney and the Second Circuit were complicit in the focus of the majority on
whether there was a duty to disclose. The indictment charged that Chiarella
traded “without disclosing the material nonpublic information he had obtained
in connection with his employment,”140 and the Second Circuit affirmed the
conviction by holding that “[a]nyone corporate insider or not who regularly
receives material nonpublic information may not use that information to trade in

137. Justice Powell is sometimes thought of as a moderate, but was actually a rabid pro-business
conservative whose “Manifesto” resulted in the formation of conservative think tanks. In his Memorandum or
Manifesto, he asserted:
No thoughtful person can question that the American economic system is under broad
attack. . . .
The sources are varied and diffused. They include, not unexpectedly, the Communists, New
Leftists and other revolutionaries who would destroy the entire system, both political and economic.
These extremists on the left are far more numerous, better financed, and increasingly are more
welcomed and encouraged by other elements of society, than ever before in our history. But they
remain a small minority, and are not yet the principal cause for concern.
The most disquieting voices joining the chorus of criticism, come from perfectly respectable
elements of society: from the college campus, the pulpit, the media, the intellectual and literary
journals, the arts and sciences, and from politicians.
Memorandum from Lewis F. Powell, Jr. to Mr. Eugene B. Synder, Jr., Chairman, Educ. Comm., U.S.
Chamber of Commerce 1–3 (Aug. 23, 1971) [hereinafter Powell Memorandum] (on file with Washington
& Lee University School of Law Scholarly Commons).
138. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78b (West 2015).
139. H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91 (1975) (Conf. Rep.).
140. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 244 (1980) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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securities without incurring an affirmative duty to disclose.”141 Thus, both
bought into the inept phraseology of Texas Gulf Sulfur that the obligation was
to “disclose or abstain” rather than “abstain until disclosable.” In point of fact,
the language of the Second Circuit would be compatible with the Cady, Roberts
rule if the Second Circuit had simply deleted the phrase “without incurring an
affirmative duty to disclose” in the above sentence.
The foregoing illustrates the soundness of my assertion that the Texas Gulf
Sulfur court created unnecessary mischief when it articulated the mantra
“disclose or abstain” instead of more accurately articulating a standard of
“abstain until disclosable.”
Had the mantra been “abstain until disclosable,” the Supreme Court would
not have had the opportunity to wax eloquently on its inability to find a basis for
any duty of Chiarella to disclose the confidential information to target
shareholders—an absurd issue in the first place since Chiarella clearly had a duty
not to disclose to anyone pursuant to his employment.
The ineptness of the “disclose or abstain” standard does not, however, let
the Supreme Court off the hook for the distraction it created by focusing upon
the absurd proposition that it needed to find a common law duty that Chiarella
owed to target shareholders in order to convict him under federal law. In effect,
Justice Powell engaged in a masterful distraction to introduce uncertainty and
ambiguity into the law of insider trading.
According to Chief Justice Burger, in his dissent, the jury was told:
[In] simple terms, the charge is that Chiarella wrongfully took advantage of
information he acquired in the course of his confidential position at Pandick
Press and secretly used that information when he knew other people trading
in the securities market did not have access to the same information that he
had at a time when he knew that that information was material to the value
of the stock.142

This charge clearly fits within the “seminal” Cady, Roberts standard that
Chiarella knowingly took information that was intended only for corporate
purposes and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and used it unfairly,
realizing that his knowledge was not available to others who traded in the
market. This formulation of the fraud was also consistent with the congressional
policy that the purpose of the securities laws was to “assure that dealing in
securities is fair and without undue preferences or advantages among
investors.”143
Instead of dealing with existing law and revising the Texas Gulf Sulfur
standard to “abstain until disclosable,” Justice Powell, who authored the famous
“Powell Memorandum”144 challenging “liberal” positions such as auto safety,
subtly and cleverly took the law of insider trading in a new and restrictive

141.
142.
143.
144.

United States v. Chiarella, 588 F.2d 1358, 1365 (2d Cir. 1978) (emphasis added).
Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 243–44 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (alteration in original).
H.R. REP. NO. 94-229, at 91.
Powell Memorandum, supra note 137.
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direction. Justice Powell also began to undercut the notion of fairness that was
inherent in the securities laws, stating that “not every instance of financial
unfairness constitutes fraudulent activity under § 10 (b).”145 He continued his
campaign against “fairness” in the subsequent insider trading opinion in
Dirks.146
The majority opinion declined to address the misappropriation theory
articulated by Chief Justice Burger,147 and again avoided it in the Carpenter
case. Nevertheless, while Justice Burger lost the battle, he ultimately won the
war when the Supreme Court adopted the misappropriation theory in
O’Hagan.148
B. THE DIRKS DECISION—TIPPEE DOESN’T SIN UNLESS TIPPER SINS
If Chiarella was bad, Dirks was worse, both on the facts and the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence. Reading the majority and dissenting opinions is like
watching two dramatically different movies: one involves a hero and the other a
desperado.149
Dirks involved an unbelievable set of facts. Equity Funding was an
insurance company that wanted to enhance its earnings.150 Since an insufficient
number of real persons purchased its policies, it began creating people and, since
the insurance business involves both inflows (customers paying premiums) and
outflows (customers dying and beneficiaries collecting on the policies), Equity
Funding also needed to kill some people.151 Fortunately, the company only killed
some of the fictitious people that it had created.152
Secrist, an unhappy former executive of Equity Funding, informed Dirks,
an analyst, of the scam and asked Dirks to publicize the fraud.153 While Dirks

145. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232.
146. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1983).
147. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Arguably, a majority of the Justices in Chiarella
accepted the misappropriation theory: the three dissenters, Justice Brennan concurring with the judgment, and
Justice Stevens, in his concurring opinion.
148. United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 650 (1997).
149. The opinion describes Dirks’ investigation in the Los Angeles Equity Funding office as innocent,
stating that “[n]either Dirks nor his firm owned or traded . . . stock,” but instead, he “openly discussed the
information” resulting in some clients and investors selling their holdings. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649. The Court
also favorably frames Dirks’ involvement in describing the SEC decision: “[r]recognizing, however, that Dirks
‘played an important role in bringing [Equity Funding’s] massive fraud to light’ . . . the SEC only censured him.”
Id. at 651–52 (second alteration in original) (citing Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17480, 1981
WL 36329 (Jan. 22, 1981)). The dissent, however, describes Dirks’ investigation differently, stating: “Instead
of reporting that information to the Securities and Exchange Commission . . . Dirks began to disseminate the
information to his clients,” and “[a]s he gathered more information, he selectively disclosed it to his clients.” Id.
at 669–70 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent also states that “Dirks’ attempts to disseminate the information
to nonclients were feeble, at best.” Id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The effect of this, the dissent states,
was that “Dirks’ clients were able to shift the losses that were inevitable.” Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
150. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649.
151. Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17480, 1981 WL 36329, at *2 (Jan. 22, 1981).
152. Id.
153. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 649–50.
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took some steps to publicize the fraud,154 he also told a number of clients and
institutional investors, of which five of the latter liquidated holdings in Equity
Funding worth $16 million.155 As a result of the increased trading and drop in
price, the New York Stock Exchange suspended trading, the SEC filed a
complaint, and Equity Funding officers and directors were indicted.156
The majority began its analysis by interpreting Chiarella as requiring a
breach of common law fiduciary duty, or duty of confidentiality, as a
prerequisite to finding fraudulent activity in insider trading.157 The Court
asserted that it would not “recogniz[e] a general duty between all participants in
market transactions to forgo actions based on material, nonpublic
information.”158 As will be developed later, the Supreme Court’s horror in
recognizing such a duty is undercut when one recognizes that a defendant’s
conduct is illegal only when it can be established that the defendant has the
requisite state of mind, or scienter.
The Court then stated that there are “analytical difficulties” in “policing
tippees who trade on inside information,”159 and that it is “unclear how a tippee
acquires the Cady, Roberts duty to refrain from trading on inside
information.”160 Perhaps the Court would have found it helpful to have read the
Cady, Roberts decision since a tippee, trading on inside information, was exactly
the subject matter of the opinion. That the Supreme Court can acknowledge that
Cady, Roberts is a seminal opinion, but not understand the case, is mindboggling. Instead of clarifying existing law, the Dirks opinion muddled it.
Cady, Roberts was clear: “those persons who are in a special relationship
with a company and privy to its internal affairs . . . thereby suffer correlative
duties in trading in its securities.”161 With regard to tippees, their liability arises
from “a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to information intended

154. Dirks attempted to contact The Wall Street Journal to publicize the fraud on March 12, and succeeded
on March 19 when he was told by Herbert Lawson, the bureau chief, that Lawson would refer the matter to a
Journal reporter based in Los Angeles where Equity Funding was located. Id. at 670. Dirks later met with
William Blundell, the Journal’s Los Angeles bureau chief on March 21. Id. Blundell indicated he would pursue
his own inquiry but did appear skeptical. Id.
155. Id. at 649. See SEC v. MacDonald, 699 F.2d 47, 58 (1st Cir. 1983) (“In an SEC enforcement action, a
court can legitimately seek to ‘disgorge ill-gotten gains or to restore the status quo, or to accomplish both
objectives.’” (quoting SEC v. Commonwealth Chem. Sec. Inc., 574 F.2d 90, 95, 102 (2d Cir. 1978)); see also
SEC v. Yun, 148 F. Supp. 2d 1287, 1293 (M.D. Fla. 2001) (ordering defendants to disgorge the profits of their
insider trading scheme); SEC v. Druffner, 517 F. Supp. 2d 502, 512 (D. Mass. 2007) (requiring defendant to
disgorge profits in the amount of $732,281); SEC v. Happ, 295 F. Supp. 2d 189, 198 (D. Mass. 2003) (ruling
that disgorgement of the loss avoided is appropriate); SEC v. Ingoldsby, SEC Memorandum and Order, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 95,351 (May 15, 1990) (ordering that defendant disgorge profits of $24,663); SEC
v.
Smith, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 98,564 (2015) (ordering defendant to disgorge profits of $43,342.88).
156. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 650.
157. Id. at 654–655.
158. Id. at 655 (quoting Chiarella v. United States, 455 U.S. 222, 232–23 (1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
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to be available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone.”162 Violations require scienter, which means that the defendant knew,
or was reckless in not knowing, that the “information [was] intended to be
available only for a corporate purpose and not for the personal benefit of
anyone.” 163 Once this test is met, Cady, Roberts would find the defendant to be
culpable, irrespective of whether the tipper received a benefit or breached any
fiduciary duty—recall that the tipper in Cady, Roberts did not sin, because the
tipper neither breached a fiduciary duty nor received any benefit.164
Having created a problem where one theretofore did not exist, the majority
set forth to solve it. The SEC’s position in Dirks was simple—the tippee
inherited the insider’s duty:
In tipping potential traders, Dirks breached a duty which he had assumed as
a result of knowingly receiving confidential information from [Equity
Funding] insiders. Tippees such as Dirks who receive non-public, material
information from insiders become ‘subject to the same duty as [the] insiders.’
Such a tippee breaches the fiduciary duty which he assumes from the insider
when the tippee knowingly transmits the information to someone who will
probably trade on the basis thereof.… Presumably, Dirks’ informants were
entitled to disclose the [Equity Funding] fraud in order to bring it to light and
its perpetrators to justice. However, Dirks—standing in their shoes—
committed a breach of the fiduciary duty which he had assumed in dealing
with them, when he passed the information on to traders.165

But, according to the majority, Chiarella determined that “there can be no
duty to disclose where the person who has traded on inside information ‘was not
[the corporation’s] agent . . . was not a fiduciary, [or] was not a person in whom
the sellers [of the securities] had placed their trust and confidence.’”166
Justice Powell referenced the Cady, Roberts duty numerous times, but was
oblivious to what Cady, Roberts actually held. For example:
Thus, some tippees must assume an insider’s duty to the shareholders not
because they receive inside information, but rather because it has been made
available to them improperly. And for Rule 10b–5 purposes, the insider’s
disclosure is improper only where it would violate his Cady, Roberts duty.
Thus, a tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a corporation
not to trade on material nonpublic information only when the insider has
breached his fiduciary duty to the shareholders by disclosing the information
to the tippee and the tippee knows or should know that there has been a
breach.167

In fact, Cady, Roberts held just the opposite. As stated above, Cady,
Roberts was a “bad news” situation where the price is likely to decrease, so the
insider sells to persons to whom he arguably does not have a common law

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id.
Id.
See supra text accompanying notes 36–38.
Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655–56 (citing 21 S.E.C. Docket, at 1410 n.42) (citations omitted).
Id. at 654 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 232 (1980)).
Id. at 660.
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fiduciary duty.168 The defendant was not a traditional corporate insider and was
not a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and confidence. In
addition, the tipper breached no fiduciary duty and received no benefit.
Having rejected the SEC view that “the antifraud provisions require equal
information among all traders,”169 the Court interpreted Chiarella as setting
forth that “only some persons, under some circumstances, will be barred from
trading while in possession of material nonpublic information.”170 The Court
considered the duty to “disclose-or-refrain” to be “extraordinary,”171 and
reaffirmed its view of Chiarella as holding “[a] duty [to disclose] arises from
the relationship between parties . . . and not merely from one’s ability to acquire
information because of his position in the market.”172
Since only some persons under some circumstances are prohibited from
using inside information and since the duty to disclose or refrain is
extraordinary, one would draw the conclusion that insider trading is the
exception and not the rule. In such a case, it would not be unlikely that there
would be an explosion in insider trading following these decisions, but that is
exactly what happened.173
At this point in the decision, we know that a tippee’s duty is derivative, and
that a tippee is liable only when the tipper has “sinned,” or breached a fiduciary
duty. Once again, the majority opinion manifested its concern for analysts.
According to the Court, a legitimate use of inside information occurs when
management conveys information to analysts:
In some situations, the insider will act consistently with his fiduciary duty to
shareholders, and yet release of the information may affect the market. For
example, it may not be clear—either to the corporate insider or to the
recipient analyst—whether the information will be viewed as material
nonpublic information. Corporate officials may mistakenly think the
information already has been disclosed or that it is not material enough to
affect the market.174

Justice Powell resolved this dilemma by asserting: “[w]hether disclosure is
a breach of duty therefore depends in large part on the purpose of the
disclosure.”175 In so doing, he once again inadvertently misinterpreted Cady,
Roberts. According to Justice Powell, “[t]his standard was identified by the SEC
itself in Cady, Roberts: a purpose of the securities laws was to eliminate the ‘use
of inside information for personal advantage.’”176 But the culprit who received
a benefit in Cady, Roberts was not the tipper, but rather the tippee.
168. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 908 (1961).
169. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 657.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 657–58 (citing Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 231–32, n.14 (1980)) (alterations in
original).
173. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 2287 (1983); H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 6044 (1988).
174. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 662.
175. Id.
176. Id. (quoting Cady, Roberts, & Co. 40 S.E.C. 907, 912, n. 15 (1961)).
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The Court put the pieces of the picture together as follows: “Thus, the test
is whether the insider personally will benefit, directly or indirectly, from his
disclosure. Absent some personal gain, there has been no breach of duty to
stockholders. And absent a breach by the insider, there is no derivative
breach.”177
According to the Court, this will introduce objectivity, as opposed to
subjectivity, into the analysis: “This requires courts to focus on objective
criteria, i.e., whether the insider receives a direct or indirect personal benefit
from the disclosure, such as a pecuniary gain or a reputational benefit that will
translate into future earnings.”178
The Court loosened this objective criteria by acknowledging the possibility
that the insider might recognize a benefit by making a gift of the information.
This addition was germane to and in fact, dispositive of, the Salman decision:
“The elements of fiduciary duty and exploitation of nonpublic information also
exist when an insider makes a gift of confidential information to a trading
relative or friend. The tip and trade resemble trading by the insider himself
followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”179
Having thus formulated the law of the case, resolution was simple:
The tippers received no monetary or personal benefit for revealing Equity
Funding’s secrets, nor was their purpose to make a gift of valuable
information to Dirks. As the facts of this case clearly indicate, the tippers
were motivated by a desire to expose the fraud. In the absence of a breach of
duty to shareholders by the insiders, there was no derivative breach by
Dirks.180

Even here, the Supreme Court’s approach was simplistic and outcomedeterminative. In the view of the majority, the tipper and tippee were heroes—
they sought to expose a fraud. The dissent took a much more jaundiced view of
the situation: “In disclosing that information to Dirks, Secrist intended that Dirks
would disseminate the information to his clients, those clients would unload their
Equity Funding securities on the market, and the price would fall precipitously,
thereby triggering a reaction from the authorities.”181
There were no heroes in the dissenters’ view, only winners and losers:
Dirks’ clients gained and the public lost. As the dissent pointed out:
By that time [when the SEC finally suspended trading], Dirks’ clients had
unloaded close to $15 million of Equity Funding stock and the price had
plummeted from $26 to $15. The effect of Dirks’ selective dissemination of
Secrist’s information was that Dirks’ clients were able to shift the losses that

177. Id.
178. Id. at 663. The court did recognize that “[d]etermining whether an insider personally benefits from a
particular disclosure, a question of fact, will not always be easy for courts. But it is essential, we think, to have
a guiding principle for those whose daily activities must be limited and instructed by the SEC’s inside-trading
rules.” Id. at 664.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 667 (citation omitted).
181. Id. at 669 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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were inevitable due to the Equity Funding fraud from themselves to
uninformed market participants.182

The dissent also rejected the notion that Dirks acted altruistically:
The Court’s implicit suggestion that Dirks did not gain by this selective
dissemination of advice is inaccurate. The ALJ found that because of Dirks’
information, Boston Company Institutional Investors, Inc., directed business
to Delafield Childs that generated approximately $25,000 in commissions.
App. 199, 204–205. While it is true that the exact economic benefit gained
by Delafield Childs due to Dirks’ activities is unknowable because of the
structure of compensation in the securities market, there can be no doubt that
Delafield and Dirks gained both monetary rewards and enhanced reputations
for “looking after” their clients.183

The dissent would not accept the premise that “the end justified the means.”184
The SEC also took a dim view of the majority’s approach, asserting that
“if inside-trading liability does not exist when the information is transmitted for
a proper purpose but is used for trading, it would be a rare situation when the
parties could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate business justification for
transmitting the information.”185 The majority disagreed, stating “[w]e think the
SEC is unduly concerned.”186 History has proved the SEC correct. As this
Article will demonstrate, it is very difficult to obtain a conviction if the tipper
and tippee concoct a story and stick to it.187
For the dissent, the fallacy in the majority’s approach was that it
“engraft[ed] a special motivational requirement on the fiduciary duty doctrine,”
which “excuses a knowing and intentional violation of an insider’s duty to
shareholders if the insider does not act from a motive of personal gain.”188
According to the dissent:
The fact that the insider himself does not benefit from the breach does not
eradicate the shareholder’s injury. It makes no difference to the shareholder
whether the corporate insider gained or intended to gain personally from the
transaction; the shareholder still has lost because of the insider’s misuse of
nonpublic information. The duty is addressed not to the insider’s motives,
but to his actions and their consequences on the shareholder. Personal gain
is not an element of the breach of this duty.189

A major problem in the majority’s analysis was that, while asserting that
only some insider trading was wrongful, it provided us with very little insight as
to what is a legitimate use of inside information. The Court appeared to have no
problem with insiders making selective disclosure to analysts:
182. Id. at 670 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 669 n.4 (citations omitted) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
184. Id. at 677 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
185. Id. at 663.
186. Id.
187. See SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756, 762 (W.D. Okla. 1984) (describing a situation where the tipper
and tippee concocted a story that the tippee, while laying on a bench at a track meet, overheard the tipper and
his wife, several feet away, discussing a forthcoming trip due to a recapitalization).
188. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 668 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 673–74 (Blackman, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
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Imposing a duty to disclose or abstain solely because a person knowingly
receives material nonpublic information from an insider and trades on it
could have an inhibiting influence on the role of market analysts, which the
SEC itself recognizes is necessary to the preservation of a healthy market. It
is commonplace for analysts to “ferret out and analyze information,” and this
often is done by meeting with and questioning corporate officers and others
who are insiders.190

Once again, Justice Powell’s analysis was sloppy. From reading the
foregoing, one would gather the impression that the SEC was fearful that holding
Dirks liable would inhibit the legitimate work of analysts. In fact, the decision
of the SEC was to the contrary. Here is how the SEC viewed the role of analysts:
In this connection, it is important to recognize that this [Dirks] is not a case
in which a skilled analyst weaves together a series of publicly available facts
and non-material inside disclosures to form a “mosaic” which is only
material after the bits and pieces are assembled into one picture. We have
long recognized that an analyst may utilize non-public, inside information
which in itself is immaterial in order to fill in “interstices in analysis.” That
process is legitimate even though such “tidbits” of inside information “may
assume heightened significance when woven by the skilled analyst into the
matrix of knowledge obtained elsewhere,” thereby creating material
information. But this is not such a case. Secrist’s information certainly was
not “seemingly inconsequential data.” Instead, its significance was
immediately clear. Upon receipt of the information from Secrist, there was
no need for Dirks to obtain, and he did not obtain, significant new facts to be
woven together with Secrist’s original allegations. All that occurred was
corroboration and confirmation from inside sources of the original
allegations. Under these circumstances, our decision here will not discourage
analysts from engaging in the legitimate and desirable function of seeking
out corporate information.191

Justice Powell’s bias in favor of the business community, as opposed to the
interests of individual shareholders, would be apparent to anyone who has read
the Powell Memorandum, in which he saw a “massive assault upon [the business
community’s] fundamental economics, upon its philosophy, upon its right to
continue to manage its own affairs, and indeed upon its integrity . . . .”192 He saw
this attack as essentially led by the left and those who advocated for the
regulatory state. No wonder Justice Powell was more sympathetic to the world
of analysts than to the viewpoint of the SEC. Justice Powell’s approach benefits
corrupt traders, who make millions of dollars from illicitly obtained information,
as illustrated by the facts in Newman.193
To the extent that Justice Powell’s viewpoint had any validity, it has been
undercut by two subsequent developments. In 2000, the SEC adopted Regulation
FD, which required that, when a corporation discloses material nonpublic
information, particularly to market professionals such as analysts, it makes a
190. Id. at 658 (citation omitted).
191. Raymond L. Dirks, Exchange Act Release No. 17480, 21 S.E.C. Docket 1401, 1409 (Jan. 22, 1981)
(opinion of the commission) (citations omitted).
192. Powell Memorandum, supra note 137, at 7.
193. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443, 447–48 (2d Cir. 2014).
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public disclosure either immediately, in the case of an intentional disclosure, and
promptly, in the case of an inadvertent disclosure. 194
In addition, about this time, during the dot-com bubble, the analyst
community grossly embarrassed itself by publicly touting stocks which it
privately disparaged as “junk,” “crap,” and a “powder keg.”195 Ten investment
banking firms and two analysts paid 1.4 billion dollars in fines, restitution, and
other payments.196
Similarly, the following assertion by Justice Powell was never accurate: “It
is the nature of this type of information, and indeed of the markets themselves,
that such information cannot be made simultaneously available to all of the
corporation’s stockholders or the public generally.”197
Recall that in Cady, Roberts, the company instructed a secretary to notify
the exchanges and Dow Jones about the dividend cut.198 In today’s world, such
an assertion is all the more fallacious. Regulation FD requires disclosure of
material nonpublic information and there are many ways in which disclosure can
be made. Companies are mandated to file quarterly reports setting forth financial
information;199 in the interim, current reports can be filed;200 and companies
have websites and frequently set up investor conference calls.201 On top of this,
it is still possible to notify the stock exchanges, NASDAQ, and Dow Jones.
The lack of respect by the majority for the notion of parity of information
is at odds with the frequently repeated Congressional policy that the playing field
should be level and that no investor should have any undue advantage.202
Congress itself has stated that, if Dirks is “properly and narrowly construed by
the courts, the Commission’s insider trading program will not be adversely
affected.”203
C. THE CARPENTER CASE—CONFUSION OVER “IN CONNECTION WITH.”
Carpenter v. United States, the third of the 1980s trilogy of insider trading
cases, involved a unique scam to make profits by trading stocks.204 David
Carpenter and R. Foster Winans, one of the writers of the “Heard on the Street,”
a widely-read financial column at that time in The Wall Street Journal, were
194. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2012).
195. Top 10 Regrettable Emails, Pumping and Dumping, TIME http://content.time.com/time/specials/
packages/article/0,28804,1907771_1907778_1907820,00.html (last visited July 27, 2019).
196. Stephen Labaton, Wall Street Settlement: The Overview; 10 Wall St. Firms Reach Settlement in Analyst
Inquiry, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 29, 2003), http://www.nytimes.com/2003/04/29/business/wall-street-settlementoverview-10-wall-st-firms-reach-settlement-analyst.html.
197. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
198. See supra text accompanying notes 36–39.
199. 17 CFR §§ 240.13a-1; 240.13a-13 (2018).
200. 17 CFR § 240.13a-11.
201. Brian Beers, What is an Earnings Conference Call?, INVESTOPEDIA, (May 31, 2018),
http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/04/052104.asp.
202. See supra notes 12–13 and accompanying text.
203. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 15 (1983).
204. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987).

J - MURDOCK_19 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE)

August 2019]

THE FUTURE OF INSIDER TRADING

8/7/2019 6:40 PM

1577

roommates.205 Peter Brant, one of the leading brokers at the Kidder, Peabody
brokerage house, had noticed that the stock of companies discussed by Winans
would “move” after his column was published—up when the column was
positive, and down when it was negative.206 Brant approached Winans about
leaking the content of the columns before publication.207 Brant would buy a
company’s stock when Winans was about to write a positive column about the
company and would sell short when Winans was about to write a negative
column on a company.208 After the column was published and the stock moved,
Brandt would close out the transaction.209 Over a four-month period, the scheme
netted almost $700,000.210
After the scheme was uncovered, Brant cooperated, while Winans and
Carpenter were convicted both of wire fraud and a violation of Rule 10b-5
predicated upon the misappropriation theory.211 The Supreme Court affirmed the
wire fraud conviction but split 4-4 on the Rule 10b-5 count.212
What undoubtedly troubled some members of the Court was the fact that
the Rule 10b-5 conviction was predicated upon the schemers misappropriating
the publication schedule of The Wall Street Journal. For some this raised a
problem as to whether the fraud was “in connection with” a purchase or sale of
a security.213
This case, like Chiarella, involved, not a corporate insider misusing
company-specific information for his own benefit, but rather “market”
information used by market professionals for their own advantage. It also
illustrates the tenuous premise of the misappropriation theory in which a fraud
in one area, misappropriating one person’s information, is used to engage in a
stock transaction with entirely different persons.
Winans engaged in this scheme because he did not believe that The Wall
Street Journal adequately compensated him for the exposure his column gave
the Journal. But what if his superiors at the Journal suggested that, in lieu of
giving him a salary raise, he should simply trade stocks based upon his column’s
impact? Now there is no misappropriation of the Journal’s printing schedule;
rather, he has been given permission to access it for his benefit.
Thus, this Article argues that it would be more straightforward to recognize
the so-called “possession” theory and require market professionals not to use
material, nonpublic information for their own benefit prior to dissemination to
the public.

205. Id. at 22.
206. Id. at 23.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. See id. at 24. In addition, arguably, and to retaliate, Winans published a book, Trading Secrets, which
detailed Brant’s role in the scheme, and painted Brandt in a very unfavorable light.
212. Id.
213. See United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 667 (1997).
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It was ten more years before the Supreme Court recognized the
misappropriation theory and determined that the “in connection with”
requirement was satisfied because the purpose of misappropriating information
was to engage in a securities transaction.214 Thus, the Carpenter case is
noteworthy for what it did not do, rather than for the insights it provided.215

III. THE AFTERMATH OF CHIARELLA AND DIRKS
The 1980s witnessed an explosion of insider trading. This is recounted in
the well-documented book, Den of Thieves,216 as well as in the committee reports
to the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984,217 and the Insider Trading
Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988.218 While correlation does not
necessarily mean causation, the message from the Supreme Court was clear:
only some insider trading in some circumstances is unlawful, and the duty to
“disclose or abstain” is extraordinary. It would be naïve to assume that such a
judicial philosophy would not embolden investors who are greedy and also riskaverse. The SEC’s warning that “it would be a rare situation when the parties
could not fabricate some ostensibly legitimate business justification for
transmitting the information”219 more than played out in subsequent cases. In
fact, what developed was not the fabrication of business justification, but rather
pure fabrication.220 The reality is that conviction for insider trading is difficult if
the tipper and tippee concoct a false story and stick to it.221

214. See generally id.
215. The House of Representatives recognized in a report:
“The Court divided on a 4–4 vote on the question of whether Winans’ ‘misappropriation’ of
information rightfully belonging to his employer constituted insider trading, even absent any direct
fiduciary duty owned from Winans to the issuers or purchasers and sellers of the securities. The
Court’s opinion contained no discussion of the issue. Thus the misappropriation theory clearly
remains valid in the Second Circuit, the lower Court in the Winans case, but is unresolved nationally.
In the view of the Committee, however, this type of security fraud should be encompassed within
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.”
H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 10 (1988).
216. STEWART, supra note 10.
217. Insider Trading Sanction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264 (1984) (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1998)).
218. Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act Of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677
(1988) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
219. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983).
220. See, e.g., SEC v. Switzer, 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
221. On the other hand, if the tipper and tippee tell the truth instead of fabricating a story, they will be
convicted of insider trading. For example, in SEC v. Yun, 327 F. 3d 1263 (2003), a real estate agent walked into
the office as another agent was talking to her husband about the reason for the low valuation of stock in their
post-nuptial agreement. Id. at 1268. That evening, at a dinner, they further discussed the matter and the wife
apparently confirmed the information, and the other realtor traded on it. Id. If they had lied about discussing the
matter together and agreed that the first realtor had just overheard a telephone conversation, the charge of insider
trading most likely would not have been successful because there was no conscious transmission of information
to the trading realtor. See supra notes 191-196 and accompanying text. The law is in a sad state when it
encourages lying.
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A. CASES ILLUSTRATING THE BENEFITS OF LYING AND THE CONSEQUENCES
OF TELLING THE TRUTH
Shortly after the Chiarella and Dirks decisions, two cases illustrated the
SEC’s concern about fabrication. In SEC v. Switzer,222 a famous football coach
attended his son’s track meet and had several conversations with a corporate
executive who was a sponsor of Switzer’s football television program.
According to the testimony:
Sometime in the afternoon, after his last conversation with G. Platt, Switzer
laid down on a row of bleachers behind the Platts to sunbathe while waiting
for his son’s next event. While Switzer was sunbathing, he overheard G. Platt
talking to his wife about his trip to New York the prior day. In that
conversation, G. Platt mentioned Morgan Stanley and his desire to dispose
of or liquidate Phoenix. G. Platt further talked about several companies
bidding on Phoenix. Switzer also overheard that an announcement of a
“possible” liquidation of Phoenix might occur the following Thursday.
Switzer remained on the bleachers behind the Platts for approximately
twenty minutes then got up and continued to move about.223

How plausible is this story? In an outdoor stadium, have you ever tried to listen
to a conversation between two people a few feet away?
So what did Switzer do? That weekend, he initiated conversations with
three groups of investors.224 The first group purchased 6000 shares for about
$260,000 and sold a few days later for a profit of $118,587.225 A second group
put up the capital to purchase 16,500 shares for a total investment of about
$700,000; the stock was sold a few days later for a profit of $267,728, of which
$110,491 was paid to Switzer and his buddy who introduced him to the group.226
A third group purchased 13,000 shares for a total investment of about $575,000,
making a profit of $205,055, of which $85,310 was paid to Switzer and his
buddy.227
How likely would it be that a group of investors would invest these sums
of money and split the profits with the tipper, who supposedly overheard an
unnamed executive talking to his wife at a track meet while the tipper lay on the
bleachers a few feet away?228

222. 590 F. Supp. 756 (W.D. Okla. 1984).
223. Id. at 762.
224. Id. at 762–63.
225. Id. at 759.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. In 1987, I put on a program for the Continuing Legal Education Satellite Network on “Insider Trading:
Definitions, Enforcement, Defense and Avoidance,” with a balanced panel from the SEC and private industry.
In connection with the program, I used actors to create a vignette depicting the supposed facts in the Switzer
case. After watching the vignette, the general consensus was that Switzer’s story was inherently implausible.
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These dollar amounts may not seem impressive in today’s world where
insiders are raking in millions of dollars, but, in the 1980s, they were quite
significant. You could calculate a factor of about four to get the equivalent value
in today’s dollars.
In a highly publicized case at the time,229 United States v. Reed,230 Thomas
Reed, a former secretary of the Air Force, purchased 500 out of the money call
options on Amax for $3000, enabling him to buy Amax stock at $50 per share.231
The stock was then trading at $38; consequently, the options were “out of the
money” and thus very inexpensive.232 Prior to his purchase, he had several
telephone conversations with his father, a director of Amax, who was out of
town.233 The next day, Amax announced that it had rejected a buyout offer from
Chevron, and the price of its stock soared.234 Reed then sold his options for
$430,000.235 While his father knew of the offer from Chevron, Reed and his
father testified that they did not discuss it in their telephone conversations.236
But why else would someone buy out of the money call options that were soon
to expire?
Fast-forward to more current times and the case of SEC v. Yun,237 in which
the defendants did not fabricate a story, but apparently told the truth. Donna Yun
was entering into a postnuptial division of assets with her husband, the president
of a subsidiary of Scholastic Corporation.238 Her husband had informed her that
the earnings of scholastic would be substantially down and that is why he had
entered a low valuation.239 While she was discussing this matter on the telephone
with her attorney, a fellow realtor, Jerry Burch, entered the office and overheard
the conversation.240 He later testified that he did not learn enough from
overhearing the conversation to make a decision to trade the Scholastic stock.241
However, he and Donna went to a cocktail party that evening and discussed
the conversation.242 The following day, he purchased $19,750 in Scholastic put
options and, a day later, Scholastic announced that its earnings would be well

Charles W. Murdock, Insider Trading: Definitions, Enforcement, Defense and Avoidance, Program at the
JCPenney Conference Ctr., New York City (June 3, 1987).
229. Jury Clears Reed in Amax Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 1985), https://nyti.ms/29DtYYL.
230. 601 F. Supp 685 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). While Reed was indicted, the jury apparently believed the testimony
of the father and son. Reed, however, resigned as an advisor to President Reagan when this transaction became
public.
231. Id. at 690–91.
232. Id. at 691.
233. Id. at 690.
234. Id. at 691.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 688–93.
237. 327 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2003).
238. Id. at 1267.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1268.
241. Id.
242. Id.
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below the analysts’ expectations.243 The next day, the price of Scholastic shares
had dropped approximately forty percent, and he sold his Scholastic puts,
realizing a profit of $269,000, a 1300 percent return on his investment.244 Within
hours, the SEC commenced an investigation.245
The jury returned a verdict in favor of the SEC, but the Eleventh Circuit
reversed on the basis that the jury instructions did not require that Donna receive
a benefit from sharing information with Burch.246 The Eleventh Circuit did
recognize that a jury could reasonably conclude that “Donna expected to benefit
from her tip to Burch by maintaining a good relationship between a friend and
frequent partner in real estate deals.”247 The Eleventh Circuit also recognized
that a confidential relationship existed between husband and wife:
We conclude that the SEC provided sufficient evidence both that an
agreement of confidentiality and a history or pattern of sharing and keeping
of business confidences existed between David and Donna Yun such that
David could have reasonably expected Donna to keep confidential what he
told her about Scholastic’s pending announcement.248

This latter position is in sharp contradistinction to the Second Circuit’s
position in United States v. Chestman, where the Second Circuit held that a
confidential relationship did not exist between husband and wife:
Keith’s status as Susan’s husband could not itself establish fiduciary status.
Nor, absent a pre-existing fiduciary relation or an express agreement of
confidentiality, could the coda—“Don’t tell.” That leaves the unremarkable
testimony that Keith and Susan had shared and maintained generic
confidences before. The jury was not told the nature of these past disclosures
and therefore it could not reasonably find a relationship that inspired
fiduciary, rather than normal marital, obligations.249

The Second Circuit’s view of the marriage relationship is certainly not one
that I hold, nor is it, I suspect, one with which most people would agree. How
does the Second Circuit explain the marital privilege that one spouse need not
testify against another? Subsequent to Chestman, the SEC promulgated a rule
which set forth a presumption that there is a relationship of confidentiality
between spouses and certain other family members.250
For the sake of argument, assume that Donna and Burch agreed that Burch
made his decision based upon overhearing Donna’s phone call with her attorney
and that the subject was never discussed at the subsequent cocktail party. Would
an SEC judgment then have been possible? The husband did not breach any duty
of confidentiality or fiduciary duty by telling his wife about relevant information

243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1281.
Id. at 1280.
Id. at 1273–74.
United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 571 (2d Cir. 1991).
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b5-2 (2003).
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concerning their postnuptial division of assets. Nor did Donna breach any duty
of confidentiality or fiduciary duty by discussing the matter with her attorney.
Had Burch merely overheard the privileged conversation, Donna would not have
sinned, and thus Burch could not have sinned. Moreover, Donna did not
communicate the information to Burch with the expectation of a benefit—she
did not intentionally communicate the information at all.
In securities transactions, there are winners and losers. Why should greedy,
risk-averse investors be entitled to keep their ill-gotten gains? Is this something
that the law should facilitate? But that is exactly what the tortured opinions in
Chiarella and Dirks accomplish. Why should the existence of a benefit, or lack
thereof, determine whether or not the tippee retains the benefit from trading in
an essentially riskless transaction?
B. THE ANALYSTS’ DOT-COM FRAUDULENT SCHEME
Fast-forward ten years to the late 1990s and the emergence of a slew of
Internet-based startup companies that ultimately led to the bursting of the socalled dot-com bubble.251 Reading between the lines in the Dirks opinion, one
could conclude that Justice Powell’s goal was not to endanger the analyst
industry by exposing it to insider trading liability.252 Contrariwise, Congress did
not believe that enforcement of insider trading law would discourage legitimate
analyst activity.253
However, at this time, the analyst industry brought itself into disrepute.
Analysts were touting high-tech companies with little or no earnings, while at
the same time, privately disparaging the stock of such companies as “junk,”
“crap,” and “a disaster.”254 Nevertheless, the analysts promulgated “buy” ratings
on such companies to help their employers gain business.
The conflict of interest that infected the recommendations of analysts is
illustrated by the history of Interliant, Inc. Interliant was touted by Henry
Blodgett, the star analyst for Merrill Lynch. When Merrill Lynch initiated
coverage on August 4, 1999, the company stock was trading at $16.375, rose to
a high of $55.50, and plummeted to $4.00 as of February 21, 2001.255
“Throughout this period, Merrill’s investment-banking arm assisted Interliant in
251. Mathew Honan & Steven Leckart, 10 Years After: A Look Back at the DotCom Boom and Bust, (Feb.
17, 2010) WIRED, https://www.wired.com/2010/02/10yearsafter/.
252. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
253. H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 19 (1988).
254. See Merrill Lynch, IMPACT LAW, http://www.lawyershop.com/practice-areas/criminal-law/whitecollar-crimes/securities-fraud/lawsuits/merrill-lynch/ (last visited July 27, 2019) (explaining that, at this time,
analysts were labeling stock a “good buy” to the public, but a “bad buy” to other analysts). Examples include:
“Internet Capital Group (ICGE): E-mail: “October 6, 2000 – ‘No helpful news to relate, I’m afraid. This has
been a disaster- there really is no floor to the stock,’” followed by “Investor advice: October 5, 2000 – 2-1 rating
(buy to strong buy); “excite@home (ATHM): E-mail: June 3, 2000 – ‘ATHM is such a piece of crap!’” followed
by “Investor advice: June 3, 2000 – 2-1 rating (buy to strong buy);” “Lifeminders (LFMN) E-mail: December
4, 2000 – ‘I can’t believe what a POS that thing is,’” followed by “Investor advice: December 4, 2000 – 2-1
rating (buy to strong buy).” Id.
255. Lentell v. Merrill Lynch & Co. Inc., 396 F.3d 161, 167 (2d Cir. 2005).

J - MURDOCK_19 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE)

August 2019]

8/7/2019 6:40 PM

THE FUTURE OF INSIDER TRADING

1583

its acquisition of 27 companies, and underwrote a $150 million convertible-bond
offering.”256 The analysts hyped their ratings, not just to obtain investment
banking work for their firms, but sometimes for personal profit, such as getting
their daughters into nursery school.257
The scandal came to light when New York State Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer announced litigation against Merrill Lynch.258 Merrill Lynch, at first,
denied the allegations, but then settled for $100 million and agreed to revise its
practices with respect to analysts.259 Within a year of Merrill Lynch being sued,
ten top United States investment banking firms agreed to pay a total of $875
million in penalties and disgorgement for similar practices.260
As a result of this litigation, supposedly there would be a Chinese wall
between analysts and the investment banking side of the firm. As the Newman
case illustrates,261 there does not appear to be any Chinese wall between analysts
and portfolio managers at hedge funds.
In 1988, Congress was concerned about the dissemination of inside
information within investment banking firms that led to what it considered
illegal insider trading. To remedy this, Congress required investment banking
firms to implement procedures to prevent insider trading or else face liability
themselves:
The mergers and acquisition departments of investment houses contain
highly sensitive materials detailing the intricacies of corporate takeovers,
invaluable information in the hands of skilled market professionals. In the
view of the Committee, there is a need for an affirmative statutory obligation
for every broker, dealer and investment advisor to design effective
procedures to restrict and monitor access to such information and prevent
insider trading. The Committee links this affirmative obligation to the ITSA
penalties. The Committee believed it is necessary to expand the potential
exposure to civil penalties under ITSA beyond the primary insider trading
violators to securities firms and other “controlling persons” who knowingly

256. Id.
257. Jack Grubman, one of the leading analysts on Wall Street, sent an e-mail stating that his boss, Sanford
Weill, the chairman of Citigroup and a member of the Board of Directors of AT&T, helped Grubman to get his
twin daughters enrolled in an exclusive nursery school after Grubman began recommending AT&T stock. See
Gretchen Morgenson & Patrick McGeehan, Wall St. and the Nursery School: A New York Story, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 14, 2002), https://www.nytimes.com/2002/11/14/business/wall-st-and-the-nursery-school-a-new-yorkstory.html. Mr. Weill has acknowledged that he asked Grubman to "take a fresh look at AT&T," which was code
on Wall Street for changing your opinion. Id.
258. Merrill Ordered to Reform Ratings: New York AG Wins Court Order Finding Brokerage Firm Issued
‘Misleading Stock Ratings,’ CNN MONEY, (Apr. 8, 2002), http://money.cnn.com/2002/04/08/news/companies/
merrill/index.htm.
259. The Merrill Lynch Settlement: Good for Merrill, Not for Investors, WHARTON (June 5, 2002),
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-merrill-lynch-settlement-good-for-merrill-not-for-investors/.
260. Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm’n, Ten of Nation’s Top Investment Firms Settle Enforcement
Actions Involving Conflicts of Interest between Research and Investment Banking (Apr. 28, 2003),
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2003-54.htm.
261. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438 (2d Cir. 2014).
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or recklessly fail to take the appropriate measures to prevent insider trading
violations by their employees.262

The securities industry has changed markedly since 1988, and hedge funds
have joined investment banking firms as significant players in the securities
markets. If it was necessary in 1988 to constrain the use of inside information
by investment banks, it is all the more necessary today to constrain the use of
such information by hedge funds. Unfortunately, the Newman case, discussed in
the following section, is a step in the wrong direction.

IV. THE CURRENT SITUATION ON INSIDER TRADING
Federal courts recently handed down three noteworthy decisions:
Newman,263 by the Second Circuit in 2014; Salman,264 by the Supreme Court in
2016; and Martoma,265 by the Second Circuit in 2017 as a counterpoint to
Newman. The facts in these cases have become all too typical since, as Congress
has stated, “insider trading continues because it presents the opportunity to reap
huge profits with little risk”266 and there is a “public perception that the risk of
detection is slight.”267 Unfortunately, after Newman, there could be public
perception that, if you make the tipping extensive and convoluted enough, there
is no liability for insider trading.268
A. NEWMAN—THE BENEFIT REQUIREMENT CARRIED TO THE EXTREME
Let us consider the facts in Newman, as recounted by the Court:
The Government alleged that a cohort of analysts at various hedge funds and
investment firms obtained material, nonpublic information from employees
of publicly traded technology companies, shared it amongst each other, and
subsequently passed this information to the portfolio managers at their
respective companies. The Government charged Newman, a portfolio
manager at Diamondback Capital Management, LLC (“Diamondback”), and
Chiasson, a portfolio manager at Level Global Investors, L.P. (“Level
Global”), with willfully participating in this insider trading scheme by
trading in securities based on the inside information illicitly obtained by this
group of analysts.269

262. H.R. REP. NO. 100-910, at 15 (1988).
263. Newman, 773 F.3d at 438.
264. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420 (2016).
265. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58 (2d Cir. 2017).
266. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 21 (1983).
267. Id. at 6.
268. Shortly after the Enron decision by the Federal District Court in Texas, in response to a friend who was
the editor, I wrote a quick, “pop” piece for the Chicago Bar Record in which I coined the phrase “MICI” as a
counterpoint to the phrase “KISS.” Charles W. Murdock, Attorney Liability Under Enron, CHI. BAR REC., Apr.,
2003, at 34, 36. KISS, which stands for “keep it simple stupid,” is the tack taken by honest people. On the other
hand, MICI, which stands for “make it complex idiot,” is now the order of the day, after Newman, for those who
want to make a quick killing through insider trading. Id.
269. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 442 (2d Cir. 2014).
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What is your reaction to the foregoing set of facts? What would be the reaction
of most Americans? What would be the reaction of the Congress that enacted
ITSA and ITSFEA?
Corporate employees, who received information because of their positions,
and who knew that the information was available to them only for use in
connection with their employment, and not for their personal benefit or for the
personal benefit of others, improperly transmitted this information to analysts at
hedge funds who, in a chain of tipping, transmitted the information to portfolio
managers, who then traded upon the information and made substantial profits.
Do courts ever step back and look at the foregoing situation from the
perspective of whether this activity is right or wrong? Whether this type of
activity is to be encouraged or curtailed? Whether this type of activity is
consistent with the mandate of the securities laws that there is to be a level
playing field and that no investor should have an undue advantage over any other
investor? Are these people making millions of dollars because of their analytical
abilities or by cheating? According to the government, the “club” in Newman
made $72 million in trading profits.270 Are the federal courts not complicit by
condoning this cheating activity? Is it any wonder that a substantial amount of
our electorate is disenchanted with government and thinks that the system is
rigged for those with money and power?
I now turn to how the Second Circuit dealt with the factual situation it
recounted. Let us take the facts, as recounted by the Court,271 and put them in
graphical form:

270. Peter Lattman, Ex-Hedge Fund Manager Sentenced in Insider Trading Case, N.Y. TIMES, May 14,
2013, at B3.
271. Newman, 773 F.3d at 443.
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According to the Court, there were two critical questions that one cannot
glean by looking at the foregoing chain of transactions. The first is whether the
tippers, Robert Ray of Dell and Chris Choi of NVIDIA, received a personal
benefit for the tipping. The second question is whether the persons who
ultimately traded in the stocks of the respective companies knew of the benefit
the tippers received.
The appropriate response to both these “significant” questions addressed
by the Second Circuit is ultimately, “who cares?” Is it wrong for tippers to
disclose information only if they receive a personal benefit, as the Supreme
Court, in Dirks, foolishly held? What difference does it make from the
perspective of a level playing field or ensuring that no investor has an undue
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advantage over another investor, whether or not the tippers received a benefit?
They had information that should have been used solely for the benefit of their
employer and not for their own benefit or the benefit of anyone outside the
company. The plain fact of the matter is that it makes no difference whatsoever
whether the tippers received a benefit. The harm is the same irrespective of
whether the tippers received a personal benefit or not.
Next, let’s examine the concept of personal benefit. Clearly, receipt of ten
dollars would be a personal benefit. It is certainly a pecuniary benefit as
articulated in Dirks. But is the legality or illegality of insider trading to be
premised on such a tenuous benefit? What about a hundred dollars? Or a
thousand dollars?
What if the tippee invited the tipper for a drink? Would that be a benefit to
the tipper? Would it make a difference which one paid for the drinks? Or what
if the tippee had simply been nice to the tipper and empathized with the tipper
regarding a personal tragedy or difficulties on the job with an overbearing boss?
In law school, we are trained to be logical and conclude that no one would
do something illegal on such a flimsy “emotional” or “psychological” basis. But
the reality is that a kind word may be worth far more than a $100 bill. Why
should courts anguish over whether or not something constitutes a benefit when
the existence of a benefit is irrelevant to the public policy involved?
The Dirks notion that the tipper must receive a benefit in order to sin was
a convenient conclusion for an outcome-determinative Justice, aggressively
advocating for the corporate world. Justice Powell let a member of a class that
he admired—analysts—off the hook. This flawed logic should not be enshrined
in subsequent judicial decisions.
Unfortunately, the law has not yet caught up with the economic profession,
where behavioral economics now recognizes that people do not always act in an
abstract rational fashion.272 The law, instead of philosophizing about whether or
not the tipper received what could be considered a rational benefit, should look
to the act and not the motivation. We cannot get inside someone’s head to
determine what is important to them, a $100 bill or an empathetic response.
Even more absurd is the notion adopted in Newman that the person
ultimately held liable must know of a “personal benefit” obtained by a remote
tipper. What is necessary to hold a defendant, such as Newman, liable is an
important question. He obviously must have scienter. But for what knowledge
should he be held accountable? Should he be liable if the analyst gave the
corporate employee a $100 bill and he knew that the money was passed, but not
liable if he did not know? This question goes again to the basic issue of the
wrong sought to be remedied. Is it the evil corporate employees wrongfully
passing information, or corporate employees wrongfully passing information for
profit?

272. For an overview of behavioral economic and its findings, see DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING FAST
AND SLOW (2011).
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Since information is a corporate asset, possessed by the employees only for
a corporate purpose and available to employees only to be used for the
corporation’s benefit and not that of the employee, any transfer of material nonpublic information outside the corporation without specific authorization to do
so should be presumptively wrongful.
Assuming arguendo that the tipper must receive a benefit, why is it
necessary that the tippee know of the benefit? The tippee knows that the
corporate employee has a duty not to disseminate corporate information outside
the corporation. The tippee knows that the information is material and
nonpublic. Is this not a sufficient basis to find culpability?
Since a portfolio manager is responsible for investing millions of dollars
for the benefit of others, should such a manager not know the basis for the
recommendation to purchase a particular stock? Should he or she not know the
basis for the recommendation provided by the analysts and the source of the
information upon which the analysts were basing their recommendation? And
would he or she not be reckless in failing to investigate? Would we expect a
portfolio manager investing millions of dollars to blindly rely upon someone’s
recommendation to purchase a particular stock?
Any other approach invites the trader or portfolio manager to send his
minions to ferret out information with the coda—I don’t care how you get it, just
don’t tell me.
The Newman fact pattern reflects the MICI concept:273 the more
complicated the fraud, the less the likelihood of any accountability. Federal
courts want a nice, clean set of facts: A tips B in exchange for A receiving cash
or an equivalent tip from B. Courts would do well to read The Den of Thieves to
learn how intermingled and intermeshed the web of insider trading can be.274
Newman reflects such a situation. As the Court recognized, “a cohort of analysts
at various hedge funds and investment firms obtained material, nonpublic
information from employees of publicly traded technology companies, shared it
amongst each other, and subsequently passed this information to the portfolio
managers at their respective companies.”275
I have argued above that the use of such inside information by portfolio
managers of hedge funds is wrongful. But that is not the way the Second Circuit
saw the situation in Newman.
In Newman, the government conceded that it must establish that the tipper
received a personal benefit. However, the government argued that Dirks only
required that the “tippee know that the tipper disclosed information in breach of
a duty.”276 Nevertheless, the Second Circuit held that “the corporate insider has
committed no breach of fiduciary duty unless he receives a personal benefit in

273. See supra note 268.
274. See SHEELAH KOLHATKAR, BLACK EDGE: INSIDE INFORMATION, DIRTY MONEY, AND THE QUEST TO
BRING DOWN THE MOST WANTED MAN ON WALL STREET (2017) [hereinafter BLACK EDGE].
275. Newman, 773 F.3d at 442.
276. Id. at 447.
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exchange for the disclosure,”277 parroting Dirks,278 and thus, the tippee cannot
know of the breach unless the tippee also knows of the benefit.
But, as argued earlier, this is sheer nonsense. A corporate employee holds
the information he or she has for the benefit of the corporation, not for the benefit
of himself or herself or anyone else.279 Any unauthorized disclosure of such
information is wrongful and a breach of fiduciary duty.
Moreover, the whole idea of requiring a benefit to the tipper as a condition
of liability for the tipper is also utter nonsense. What if, in the Newman situation,
Goyal and Tortora got their tippers drunk, pried out the information, and told
Newman and Chiasson the nonpublic information. Is this now a legitimate
situation with no insider trading liability? What if Newman and Chiasson
suggested the ploy of getting the tippers drunk? Would we find a benefit to the
tippers because of the free alcohol they consumed? What if they paid for their
own drinks?
Slavish adherence to the flawed decision in Dirks leads to absurd results.
As Congress has suggested, Dirks will do no mischief if limited to its narrow
factual situation involving an attempt to publicize a fraud.280
The Second Circuit completed its circle of logic by holding that defendants
must know of the benefit in order to be liable because, without the benefit, there
is no breach of duty. The Court was shocked that the government would try to
hold liable tippees who are separated by many levels from their tippers, “[t]he
Government’s overreliance on our prior dicta merely highlights the doctrinal
novelty of its recent insider trading prosecutions, which are increasingly targeted
at remote tippees many levels removed from corporate insiders.”281
This ignores the reality of how the game is played. Consider the diagram
above. There was obviously a web of analysts exchanging information. But there
was no market impact until the portfolio managers traded. The Second Circuit
seemed disturbed that the government went after the portfolio managers in a
criminal proceeding but not the analysts:
Although Ray has yet to be charged administratively, civilly, or criminally,
and Choi has yet to be charged criminally, for insider trading or any other
277. Id. at 447.
278. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 662 (1983).
279. Since the Supreme Court is enamored with common law notions of fiduciary duty, they might well
read the early case of Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232, 234 (Ga. 1903):
It might be that the director was in possession of information which his duty to the company required
him to keep secret; and, if so, he must not disclose the fact even to the shareholder, for his obligation
to the company overrides that to an individual holder of the stock. But if the fact so known to the
director cannot be published, it does not follow that he may use it to his own advantage, and to the
disadvantage of one whom he also represents. The very fact that he cannot disclose prevents him
from dealing with one who does not know, and to whom material information cannot be made
known. . . . In a certain sense the information is a quasi asset of the company, and the shareholder is
as much entitled to the advantage of that sort of an asset as to any other regularly entered on the list
of the company’s holding.
280. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 15 (1983).
281. Newman, 773 F.3d at 448.
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wrongdoing, the Government charged that Newman and Chiasson were
criminally liable for insider trading because, as sophisticated traders, they
must have known that information was disclosed by insiders in breach of a
fiduciary duty, and not for any legitimate corporate purpose. 282

Absolutely! The portfolio managers knew that this was material, nonpublic information. How else could it have been obtained, except illegally?
With regard to the reasons why the government went easy on Ray and Choi,
the analysts, but zeroed in on Newman and Chiasson, the portfolio managers—
that is what typically happens in a corporate criminal matter. The government
goes easier on the little fish in order to catch the big fish. Who has the power in
a hedge fund: the portfolio manager or the analysts? If you want to shape up the
power structure, you go after the portfolio managers. The portfolio managers
often make tens or hundreds of millions of dollars,283 and, if you are going to
affect a change in corporate culture, it is the portfolio managers that need to be
held accountable.
The analysts understand that their job is to ferret out information and give
it to the portfolio managers who will trade on it. Everybody’s compensation is a
function of trading profits. As suggested earlier, if the portfolio manager just
winks and says, “do what you must to get me information, but don’t tell me
about it,” the Second Circuit’s tack in Newman enables the portfolio manager to
commit the perfect crime.
Adhering to the Supreme Court decision in Dirks, the Second Circuit
summarized the conditions for liability:
First, the tippee’s liability derives only from the tipper’s breach of a fiduciary
duty, not from trading on material, non-public information. Second, the
corporate insider has committed no breach of fiduciary duty unless he
receives a personal benefit in exchange for the disclosure. Third, even in the
presence of a tipper’s breach, a tippee is liable only if he knows or should
have known of the breach.284

The Second Circuit acknowledged that, “[w]hile we have not yet been
presented with the question of whether the tippee’s knowledge of a tipper’s
breach requires knowledge of the tipper’s personal benefit, the answer follows
naturally from Dirks.”285 The Second Circuit explained: “Dirks counsels us that
the exchange of confidential information for personal benefit is not separate
from an insider’s fiduciary breach; it [the personal benefit] is the fiduciary
breach that triggers liability for securities fraud under Rule 10b–5.”286
So, once again, the Dirks foolishness confounds accountability. As stated
earlier, if the federal courts are really looking back to the common law to assess
insider trading liability, an employee who discloses material corporate
282. Id. at 443–44.
283. Id. at 443. In Martoma, the hedge fund made $80.3 million in gains and avoided $194.6 million in
losses. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 62 (2d. Cir. 2017).
284. Newman, 773 F.3d at 447 (citation omitted).
285. Id.
286. Id. at 447–48.

J - MURDOCK_19 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE)

August 2019]

8/7/2019 6:40 PM

THE FUTURE OF INSIDER TRADING

1591

information to an outsider without authority to do so breaches his or her fiduciary
duty to the employer. The Second Circuit may have realized this since it added
“[f]or purposes of insider trading liability, the insider’s disclosure of
confidential information, standing alone, is not a breach.”287 The Court also
stated that “a breach of the duty of confidentiality is not fraudulent unless the
tipper acts for personal benefit.”288
But why should there be this exception from the common law perspective
on fiduciary duty when dealing with insider trading? Why is a breach of the duty
of confidentiality not actionable? Is insider trading something that we should
curtail because it deviates from the congressional notion of a level playing field,
or should we encourage insider trading by erecting roadblocks to effective
prosecution of insider trading?
Based upon Dirks, the Second Circuit concluded that “without establishing
that the tippee knows of the personal benefit received by the insider in exchange
for the disclosure, the Government cannot meet its burden of showing that the
tippee knew of a breach.”289 This phraseology suggests that, when an insider
tips, there is a bargained for consideration: “I won’t give you a tip for $10 but I
will for $100.”
But whether the tippee must know of the nature of the benefit received by
the tipper was an issue not reached by Dirks, as the Newman court
acknowledged.290 As stated earlier, Congress thought that insider trading
enforcement would not be impeded by Dirks if Dirks were limited to its facts.291
But, instead of reading Dirks narrowly, Newman sought to extend its reach.
Having determined that the tippee must know of the inside tipper’ s benefit,
the Second Circuit then analyzed whether the tippers received a benefit. The
Court acknowledged that “a defendant challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence [in a jury case] bears a heavy burden, as the standard of review is
exceedingly deferential.”292 Nevertheless, “if the evidence ‘is nonexistent or . . .
meager,’” the verdict can be set aside.293 In this case, the Second Circuit
determined that “[t]he circumstantial evidence in this case was simply too thin
to warrant the inference that the corporate insiders received any personal benefit
in exchange for their tips.”294
With respect to the Dell tip, the Second Circuit determined:
Here the “career advice” that Goyal gave Ray, the Dell tipper, was little more
than the encouragement one would generally expect of a fellow alumnus or
casual acquaintance. Crucially, Goyal testified that he would have given Ray
advice without receiving information because he routinely did so for industry

287.
288.
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.

Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
Id. at 450.
Id. at 448.
Id. at 447–48.
See supra note 280 and accompanying text.
Newman, 773 F.3d. at 451.
Id. (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012)).
Id. at 451–52.
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colleagues. Although the Government argues that the jury could have
reasonably inferred from the evidence that Ray and Goyal swapped career
advice for inside information, Ray himself disavowed that any such quid pro
quo existed. Further, the evidence showed Goyal began giving Ray “career
advice” over a year before Ray began providing any insider information.
Thus, it would not be possible under the circumstances for a jury in a criminal
trial to find beyond a reasonable doubt that Ray received a personal benefit
in exchange for the disclosure of confidential information.295

Once again, this opinion ignores human nature and the way the world
actually works. If Goyal had been giving Ray career advice for over a year,
would Ray have felt indebted to Goyal? The Second Circuit was also impressed
by the fact that Goyal testified that he would have given career advice to Ray
even if Ray did not give him any tips. What federal courts do not get is that Ray
and Goyal could be “nice guys” and generally pretty decent people. That does
not mean that they could therefore do no wrong.
In this regard, behavioral economics is instructive. As Professor Kahneman
points out, human nature wants a consistent story. For example, people have a
hard time accepting the fact that Hitler might have loved babies.296 Here, the
Second Circuit could not fathom that Goyal could be a nice guy in providing
career advice and still be a crook.
In the NVIDIA case, the Second Circuit observed that Choi (the tipper) and
Lim (the tippee) were “merely casual acquaintances.”297 Lim testified that “Choi
did not know that Lim was trading NVIDIA stock (and in fact for the relevant
period Lim did not trade stock), thus undermining any inference that Choi
intended to make a ‘gift’ of the profits earned on any transaction based on
confidential information.”298 What the Court failed to further observe is that Lim
did pass the information on to others who did in fact trade.299 Since the two
defendants were not close family members, as in Salman, according to the
Newman court, there was no benefit to the tipper from the transfer of
information.
Again, what federal courts fail to realize is that there are many reasons why
an insider may pass on confidential information. It may be because of friendship
or an attempt to curry friendship. It might be an attempt to impress another with
the insider’s position or access to information. Some people are just blowhards.
It may be to get a “leg up” by being able to call in a favor at a later date. In the
Salman case, discussed below, the younger brother gave the older brother
information because the older brother “pestered” him.300 Although it may be

295. Id. at 453 (citations omitted).
296. See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, supra note 272, at 200 (suggesting that if someone were to say that Hitler
loved little children that such a statement would have a “shocking” effect).
297. Newman, 773 F.3d at 453.
298. Id.
299. Id. at 443.
300. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016).
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unlikely, there may be bargained for consideration. While federal courts seem to
think that this is the norm, it is likely the exception.
But motive should be immaterial. Whatever the motive, the harmful effect
is the same—an investor enters the market armed with information that the rest
of the investing public does not have and cannot access. As the tippee/older
brother in Salman said, his brother’s tips gave him “timely information that the
average person does not have access to.”301 This is the unfair advantage that
Congress proscribed.302 This also is the kind of activity that the SEC proscribed
through Regulation FD.303
The Second Circuit bulwarked its conclusion by citing the oft repeated
statement in Dirks that “[a]ll disclosures of confidential corporate information
are not inconsistent with the duty . . . to shareholders.”304 Why are they not
inconsistent with the insider’s duty?
The Second Circuit noted:
Moreover, the evidence established that NVIDIA and Dell’s investor
relations personnel routinely “leaked” earnings data in advance of quarterly
earnings. Appellants introduced examples in which Dell insiders, including
the head of Investor Relations, Lynn Tyson, selectively disclosed
confidential quarterly financial information arguably similar to the inside
information disclosed by Ray and Choi to establish relationships with
financial firms who might be in a position to buy Dell’s stock. For example,
appellants introduced an email Tortora sent Newman summarizing a
conversation he had with Tyson in which she suggested “low 12% opex [was]
reasonable” for Dell’s upcoming quarter and that she was “fairly confident
on [operating margin] and [gross margin].”305

This is shocking! Two wrongs do not make a right. While the Dirks opinion
preceded Regulation FD, the release of earnings data today clearly violates
Regulation FD and is therefore unlawful. The Second Circuit should have
excoriated the investor relations personnel, not used their wrongful conduct to
protect portfolio managers who made millions on trades which, in turn, enabled
them to make millions in compensation.306

301. Id. at 425 (internal quotation marks omitted).
302. See supra notes 11–13.
303. 17 C.F.R. § 243.100 (2012).
304. Newman, 773 F.3d at 454 (internal quotation marks omitted).
305. Id.
306. Average salaries for portfolio managers in the past years have been listed as $2.2 million in 2013. Katie
Holliday, This Industry Has an Entry Level Salary of $335,000, CNBC (Nov. 3, 2013), https://www.cnbc.com/
2013/11/01/this-industry-has-an-entry-level-salary-of-335000.html. In 2014, the average salaries rose to $2.4
million. Ansuya Harjani, Hedge Fund Manager Pay Rises to $2.4 Million, CNBC (Nov. 7, 2014),
https://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/06/hedge-fund-manager-pay-rises-to-24-million.html. Then again, in 2015,
they stayed relatively consistent at $2.21 million, and they posted at $2.23 million in 2016. Lawrence
Delevingne, Hedge Fund Managers Have Lost Touch with Reality, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 21, 2016),
http://www.businessinsider.com/r-rpt-hedge-funds-slow-to-adjust-champagne-tastes-to-beer-budgets-2016-11.
For the securities industry in general, average salaries in the New York securities industry were $388,000 in
2015. Wall Street Profits Up in 2016, N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER (Mar. 15, 2017), http://www.osc.state.ny.us/
press/releases/mar17/031517.htm. (reporting last numbers from 2015). In 2014, these salaries rose to $404,800.
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The position of federal courts with regard to insider trading turns the stock
market into a roulette game, with certain investors given the right to have their
finger on the wheel.
Obviously, Circuit Courts do not have the authority to overrule the
Chiarella and Dirks decisions. However, they could follow the Congressional
dictate to interpret these cases restrictively, rather than expanding their foolish
policy to its logical, or illogical, extreme.
B. SALMAN CASE—REPUDIATION OF NEWMAN’S PECUNIARY BENEFIT
REQUIREMENT
The Salman case is almost anticlimactic. Had the Supreme Court taken the
Newman case, the opinion could have had a significant impact on the law of
insider trading. However, due to the present composition of the Supreme Court,
this impact probably would have been negative. So, those of us who believe
insider trading is wrongful and should be curtailed, should be thankful the
Supreme Court chose to review Salman.
Salman was a pedestrian “gift” exception to the requirement that the tipper
received a personal benefit. The tipper, Maher Kara, was the brother of the
intermediate tippee/tipper, Michael, who passed the information on to the
tipper’s brother-in-law, Salman.307 Salman argued, relying upon Newman, that
“there was no evidence that Maher received anything of ‘a pecuniary or similarly
valuable nature’ in exchange—or that Salman knew of any such benefit.”308 On
the other hand, the government argued, properly so in my opinion, that “a gift of
confidential information to anyone, not just a ‘trading relative or friend,’ is
enough to prove securities fraud.”309
To the extent that Newman “held that the tipper must also receive
something of a ‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to
family or friends,”310 the Supreme Court rejected Newman, and held that “[w]e
adhere to Dirks, which easily resolve[d] the narrow issue presented here.”311
However, the Court did not seem to realize that some of its analysis is
inconsistent with Dirks and its requirement of a personal benefit. The Court
pointed out that Salman’s counsel acknowledged that “Maher would have
breached his duty had he personally traded on the information here himself then
given the proceeds as a gift to his brother,”312 and concluded that, “[i]t is obvious
that Maher would personally benefit in that situation.”313 In other words, trading

Wall Street Bonuses and Profits Decline in 2015, N.Y. STATE COMPTROLLER (Mar. 7, 2016),
http://osc.state.ny.us/press/releases/mar16/030716.htm (reporting the 2014 numbers).
307. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 423–24 (2016).
308. Id. at 425.
309. Id. at 426.
310. Id. at 428.
311. Id. at 427.
312. Id. at 427–28.
313. Id.at 428.
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on inside information by an insider is wrong and is a breach of fiduciary duty to
the employer:
Here, by disclosing confidential information as a gift to his brother with the
expectation that he would trade on it, Maher breached his duty of trust and
confidence to Citigroup and its clients—a duty Salman acquired, and
breached himself, by trading on the information with full knowledge that it
had been improperly disclosed.314

When the Court recognized that Maher would have breached his fiduciary
duty had he himself traded, the Court noted that he would then obtain a personal
benefit.315 But the person who obtains the personal benefit is always the person
who trades on the inside information. Dirks’s fundamental flaw was requiring
that the disclosing/tipper receive a benefit rather than the tippee/recipient of the
information who thereupon trades.
The Supreme Court recognized the fundamental unfairness in permitting
insiders or their tippees to trade on confidential inside information. The Court
recounted Michael’s testimony: “For his part, Michael told the jury that his
brother’s tips gave him ‘timely information that the average person does not
have access to’ and ‘access to stocks, options, and what have you, that I can
capitalize on, that the average person would never have or dream of.’”316
Since the two brothers and their brother-in-law were close relatives, the
Court had no difficulty in affirming the wrongdoing. But what if they were
distant relatives or as the government argued, not relatives at all? What
difference would it make? The evil is the same. Maher is providing “timely
information that the average person does not have access to.”317 This is the evil,
not the personal benefit or lack thereof that the tipper experiences.
But the Supreme Court, in dicta before addressing the gift situation,
reverted to the notion that insider trading involving non-family tippees is only
wrongful when there is a “quid pro quo”318 between the insider and the tippee,
essentially applying contractual notions of a bargained for consideration,
without realizing that there can be many reasons why an insider would pass
along information.
C. MARTOMA—CONSTRAINING NEWMAN’S “MEANINGFULLY CLOSE
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIP” REQUIREMENT
While Salman was a pedestrian application of the gift language in Dirks to
a fairly rare situation—the transmission of inside information within a close
family relationship—and involved a pittance—319 compared to the hundreds of

314. Id.
315. See id. at 427.
316. Id. at 425.
317. Id.
318. Id. at 427.
319. The trader in Salman made only $1.5 million in profits, while the “club” in Newman made $72 million
in insider trading profits, and the insider trading in Martoma generated $80.3 million in gains and avoided $190.6
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millions of dollars involved in Newman—Martoma was a very significant
application of the Dirks gift language to a much more typical case of insider
trading.320
Martoma was a portfolio manager for S.A.C. Capital Advisers (SAC), a
hedge fund that was the subject of a massive insider trading investigation.321 His
portfolio had between $400 and $500 million in buying power and was focused
upon the pharmaceutical and healthcare industry.322 He also recommended
securities to Stephen Cohen, the head of SAC, who managed to avoid
indictment.323
Martoma invested funds in Elan and Wyeth pharmaceutical companies,
which were trying to develop an experimental drug to treat Alzheimer’s
disease.324 He also recommended these investments to Cohen.325 To get
information about the drug, Martoma established a relationship with two
doctors, Dr. Gilman and Dr. Ross, who were working on its clinical trials.326
They were paid $1000 and $1500 an hour, respectively; however, the doctors
were not paid directly by Martoma.327 His payments were routed through an
expert networking firm to the doctors.328 Dr. Gilman met with Martoma fortythree times and provided Martoma with updates on the safety of the drug,
information Dr. Gilman was expected to keep confidential.329
A June 17, 2008 press release described preliminary results as
“encouraging” and the price of Elan stock rose following the press release.330
The press release also announced that results would be presented in greater detail
at an international conference on Alzheimer’s on July 29, 2008.331 Dr. Gilman
was selected to present the results on July 29 and was then given the final results
of the clinical study.332
Dr. Gilman identified “two major weaknesses in the data,” and the
following day, July 17, he called Martoma and spoke with him for 90 minutes.333
Two days later, Martoma flew to Ann Arbor and met with Dr. Gilman in his
office, where Dr. Gilman showed him a PowerPoint presentation on the efficacy
million in losses. See id. at 424; United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014); United States v.
Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2017) (Martoma I).
320. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 58 (Martoma I). After this Article was in production, the Second Circuit amended
the opinion, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018) (Martoma II). See infra Subpart IV.C.3.
321. James B. Stewart, On Insider Trading, an Appeals Court Comes to Its Senses, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 14,
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/14/business/insider-trading-court.html.
322. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 61.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. Id.
327. Id. at 61, n.1.
328. Id.
329. Id. at 61–62, 67.
330. Id. at 62.
331. Id. at 62.
332. Id.
333. Id.
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of the study and discussed the data with him in detail.334 Dr. Gilman did not bill
for the phone conversation or this meeting.335
The next morning, Martoma sent Cohen an email labeled “It’s important,”
and followed with a telephone call, after which Martoma emailed Cohen a
summary of Elan and Wyeth holdings.336 On Monday, SAC began to hedge its
position in these two companies through short sales and option trades.337 After
the results were made public on July 29, the next day, the price of Elan and
Wyeth declined by 42% and 12%, respectively, and the trades that Martoma and
Cohen made generated $80.3 million in gains and avoided $194.6 million in
losses.338 Thereafter, Martoma received a $9 million bonus.339
Martoma argued that he and Dr. Gilman did not have a “meaningfully close
personal relationship” and that Dr. Gilman did not receive any “objective,
consequential . . . gain of a pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” in connection
with providing information to Martoma, relying upon the standards set in
Newman.340 Martoma also argued that the jury instructions were erroneous
because they did not include the limitations on personal benefit set forth in
Newman.341
1. Martoma I: Reversing Newman
The Martoma I court declined to rely upon Newman because the
intervening Supreme Court decision in Salman held that “[t]o the extent the
Second Circuit [in Newman] held that a tipper must also receive something of a
‘pecuniary or similarly valuable nature’ in exchange for a gift to family or
friends . . . this requirement is inconsistent with Dirks.”342
The Martoma court first determined that Martoma had received a
pecuniary benefit:
Martoma was a frequent and lucrative client for Dr. Gilman, who was paid
$1,000 per hour for approximately 43 consultation sessions. At the same
time, Dr. Gilman was regularly feeding Martoma confidential information
about the safety results of clinical trials involving bapineuzumab. And when
Dr. Gilman gained access to the final clinical study efficacy data in July
2008, he immediately passed it along to Martoma.343

The Court acknowledged that “Dr. Gilman did not bill Martoma
specifically for the July 17 and 19, 2008 meetings at which Dr. Gilman provided

334. Id. at 62.
335. Id. at 67.
336. Id. at 62.
337. Id.
338. Id.
339. Id. at 62–63.
340. Id. at 65 (alteration in original).
341. Id.
342. Id. at 80 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016)) (citation
omitted).
343. Id. at 67.
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Martoma with the efficacy data,”344 a factor which the dissent thought
significant.345 However, Martoma acknowledged at trial that, had he billed for
the July meetings, this would have been “tantamount to confessing that [he]
was . . . giving [Martoma] inside information.”346 The majority therefore
concluded that the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to sustain
Martoma’s conviction: Dr. Gilman regularly disclosed confidential information
in exchange for fees; therefore “‘a rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime [of insider trading] beyond a reasonable doubt’
under a pecuniary quid pro quo theory.”347
The Martoma I court then turned to the adequacy of the jury instructions.
It reversed the Newman precedent on the basis of the intervening Supreme Court
opinion in Salman regarding jury instructions. 348 The Salman opinion explicitly
rejected the Newman requirement that a tipper, in a gift situation, must receive
something of a “pecuniary or similarly valuable nature” in exchange for a gift to
family or friends.349 The Martoma court, in determining that Newman’s
requirement of a “meaningfully close personal relationship” was also no longer
valid, first acknowledged that:
While the Supreme Court did not have occasion to expressly overrule
Newman’s requirement that the tipper have a “meaningfully close personal
relationship” with a tippee to justify the inference that a tipper received a
personal benefit from his gift of inside information—because that aspect of
Newman was not at issue in Salman—“[e]ven if the effect of a Supreme
Court decision is ‘subtle,’ it may nonetheless alter the relevant analysis
fundamentally enough to require overruling prior, ‘inconsistent’
precedent.”350

The Martoma I court then concluded:
We respectfully conclude that Salman fundamentally altered the analysis
underlying Newman’s “meaningfully close personal relationship”
requirement such that the “meaningfully close personal relationship”
requirement is no longer good law. In a case involving a tipper and tippee
who were brothers, Salman found it “obvious” that an insider would
personally benefit from “trad[ing] on [inside] information . . . himself and
then giv[ing] the proceeds as a gift to his brother.” And Salman observed that

344. Id.
345. The dissent pointed out that Dr. Gilman “did not bill for the sessions in July of 2008 during which he
gave Martoma the information leading to Martoma’s trades.” Id. at 90 (Pooler, J., dissenting). The dissent opined
that “a jury could have believed SAC’s payments were for information Gilman told Martoma during other
sessions—information that was either public, non-material, or did not prompt a trade, and thus was not a violation
of insider-trading laws. Id. at 91 (Pooler, J., dissenting). As developed in the next section, the dissent represents
a mode of thinking by federal courts that is rigid and logical, but irrational, since it is predicated upon a view of
human nature that is at odds with reality.
346. Id. at 67 (alterations in original).
347. Id. (quoting United States v. Coplan, 703 F.3d 46, 62 (2d Cir. 2012) (alterations in original)).
348. Id. at 61.
349. Salman v. United States, 137. S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016).
350. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 69 (quoting Wojchowski v. Daines, 498 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir. 2007) (citation
omitted) (alterations in original).
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an insider “effectively achieve[s] the same result by disclosing the
information to [the tippee], and allowing him to trade on it,” because “giving
a gift of [inside] information is the same thing as trading by the tipper
followed by a gift of the proceeds.”351

The Court also supported its conclusion from the fact that Salman
referenced the following statement from Dirks:352 “Not only are insiders
forbidden by their fiduciary relationship from personally using undisclosed
corporate information to their advantage, but they may not give such information
to an outsider for the same improper purpose of exploiting the information for
their personal gain.”353
The Martoma I court indicated its dissatisfaction with the result reached in
Newman, where although portfolio managers realized tens of millions of dollars
in insider trading profits, their convictions were not upheld because the
relationship between the tippers and the tippees was not a “meaningfully close
personal relationship”:
Nothing in Salman’s reaffirmation of this [gift] logic supports a distinction
between gifts to people with whom a tipper shares a “meaningfully close
personal relationship”—a term left undefined in Newman, but which
apparently did not reach two people who “had known each other for years,
having both attended business school and worked . . . together,”—and gifts
to those with whom a tipper does not share such a relationship.354

The following example was used by the court to illustrate a situation where
there is not a meaningfully close personal relationship, but yet a benefit to the
tipper:
Imagine that a corporate insider, instead of giving a cash end-of-year gift to
his doorman, gives a tip of inside information with instructions to trade on
the information and consider the proceeds of the trade to be his end-of-year
gift. In this example, there may not be a “meaningfully close personal
relationship” between the tipper and tippee, yet this clearly is an illustration
of prohibited insider trading, as the insider has given a tip of valuable inside
information in lieu of a cash gift and has thus personally benefitted from the
disclosure.355

Accordingly, the court held as follows:
Thus, we hold that an insider or tipper personally benefits from a disclosure
of inside information whenever the information was disclosed “with the
expectation that [the recipient] would trade on it,” and the disclosure
“resemble[s] trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the
recipient,” whether or not there was a “meaningfully close personal
relationship” between the tipper and tippee.356

351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.

Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
Salman, 137. S. Ct. at 428.
Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 659 (1983).
Martoma, 869 F.3d at 69 (citation omitted) (second alteration in original).
Id. at 70.
Id. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
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This is a common-sense approach to the problem of insider trading. In my
opinion, the tipper has “sinned” any time the tipper discloses material nonpublic
information that the tipper is obligated to keep confidential. Yet, for the tipper
to “sin,” the tipper must have scienter and, pursuant to the approach taken by the
Martoma court, the tipper’s wrongful state of mind is determined by the fact that
the information is conveyed with the expectation that the tippee will trade on it.
Hopefully, the Martoma I approach will be followed in other jurisdictions.
But as reflected in the dissenting opinion discussed below, an outcomedeterminative court that is more focused on an abstract analysis of Dirks, and
that does not appreciate either the caution of Congress to read Dirks narrowly or
the negative effects of insider trading, could take a contrary approach.
2. The Dissent in Martoma I—Majority’s Over-Extension of Salman
The dissenting opinion in Martoma was extensive, logical to the extent that
it relied upon Dirks, but an ultimately fallacious attempt to defend and
rationalize the personal benefit requirement of Dirks. The dissent asserted that,
while the Supreme Court in Salman overruled Newman “‘[t]o the extent that it
required an insider to ‘receive something of a pecuniary or similarly valuable
nature,’” the Supreme Court “showed no disapproval of the ‘meaningfully close
personal relationship’ language in Newman.”357 Thus, the dissent acknowledged
that, in an insider trading case predicated upon the gift theory, there is no need
to show that the insider/tipper received a pecuniary or similar benefit, but argued
that there still must be a meaningfully close personal relationship between the
tipper and the tippee in order to apply the gift theory in Dirks.358
So, let us examine the rationale, as explicated by the dissent, as to why a
meaningfully close personal relationship is necessary in order to apply the gift
theory.
First, the rationale of Dirks, as analyzed by the dissent, for requiring a
benefit to the tipper was to introduce “objectivity” into the analysis.359 But how
objective is a determination of whether or not there is a “meaningfully close
personal relationship” among the parties? What if the brothers, in Salman, had
been alienated from each other for a number of years? Then, inexplicitly from a
purely logical perspective, one brother tips the other. Was this done in an attempt
to mend the relationship? Is there now a “meaningfully close personal
relationship?” Or did the tipping brother simply get tired of being badgered?As
the Supreme Court recounted in Salman, “Maher explained that he disclosed the
357. Id. at 80 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting Salman, 137 S. Ct. at 428).
358. Id. at 87 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
359. Id. at 76 (Pooler, J., dissenting). The dissent, quoting Dirks, stated: “The Supreme Court also noted that
the question of whether an insider personally benefitted from disclosure would ‘require[ ] courts to focus on
objective criteria.’” Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 663 (1983)) (alteration in
original). The dissent continued, “[r]ather than courts attempting to ‘read the parties’ minds,’ they would look
to ‘objective facts and circumstances that [would] justify . . . an inference’ that an insider received a personal
benefit.” Id. (quoting Dirks, 463 U.S. at 663–64) (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (second and third
alterations in original).
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information in large part to appease Michael (who pestered him incessantly for
it).”360
But why do we care? The tipping brother breached his duty to the
corporation by disclosing confidential, nonpublic, material corporate
information. This is where objectivity comes into play. The tipping brother was
employed by the corporation; he received material nonpublic information, not
for his own benefit, but to use for the benefit of the corporation. He disclosed
such information in breach of his duty to the corporation to keep material
nonpublic information within the corporate entity.361
The negative impact to existing shareholders from this breach of duty can
easily be identified in a “bad news” situation. The tippee brother uses the
information to sell stock to avoid a personal loss, thereby depressing the price
of the stock and the price that other shareholders would receive when they seek
to sell.362 Arguably, in a “good news” situation, the action of the tippee brother
raises the price of the stock and, possibly, only non-shareholders who seek to
buy are adversely affected. But this argument misses two fundamental points:
first, there might be existing shareholders who seek to increase their position in
the company and are thereby disadvantaged. Second, the purpose of the 1934
Securities Exchange Act was to ensure that all participants in securities
transactions play on a level playing field.363
In arguing for the personal benefit requirement in situations not involving
a meaningfully close relationship, the dissent in Martoma I offered several
examples which, supposedly, demonstrated the necessity of such requirement.364
However, none of these rationales hold water.
The first example was of an insider who revealed information
inadvertently. However, today, after the adoption of Regulation FD, the insider
in such a situation has an obligation to make a prompt public disclosure.365
Moreover, as in Cady, Roberts, a person who makes an inadvertent disclosure
would have no liability, but the person who takes advantage of such inadvertent
disclosure should be liable.366 Analyzing the situation from another perspective,
the insider making an inadvertent disclosure would not have scienter, while the
trading tippee would have scienter.
A second example suggested by the dissent is that “insiders speaking for
public-spirited reasons, such as ‘a desire to expose . . . fraud,’ do not commit

360. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 424 (2016).
361. Id.
362. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
363. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
364. See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 85-86 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
365. See 17 CFR § 243.100(a)(2) (2012) (stating that whenever any person acting on behalf of an issuer
discloses any material nonpublic information regarding the issuer or its securities, the issuer shall make public
disclosure of such information “[p]romptly, in the case of a non-intentional disclosure.”).
366. In re Cady, Roberts, & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 910–13 (1961).
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insider trading.”367 The dissent took this example from the Dirks case. As
previously discussed, in Dirks, the majority and the dissent were watching two
different movies. The majority saw Dirks as a hero, exposing a fraud, while the
dissent saw Dirks as an opportunist who, pursuant to the “backscratching” that
was prevalent in the securities industry at that time, obtained a fee of $25,000
for his employer as a result of “looking after” their clients.368
If you want to stop a crime, the proper approach is to contact the SEC or
the U.S. Attorney, not tip your clients so they can engage in so much trading that
trading in the stock is eventually suspended. Dirks was hardly a public-spirited
citizen!
The Martoma I dissent utilizes the following example to show why the
existence of a benefit to the tipper is necessary: “[A] situation where an insider
conveys material, nonpublic information to a reporter, and the reporter tells it to
a third person who trades on it. Such a situation is entirely plausible for a
financial news reporter who speaks to many sources.”369
What the dissent does not seem to realize is that the role of a reporter is to
report, not tip others. If the reporter obtained the information under the guise
that he or she was obtaining it in order to write a story, and instead used the
information to benefit some friend or acquaintance, the reporter would be
breaching the duty to his or her employer by using what is now the publication’s
information for an improper purpose and, in addition, obtaining information
under false pretenses. If the reporter publishes the information, the reporter may
be enabling the issuer to fulfill its responsibility to disclose material information.
But if the reporter first transmits the news to another person to enable them
to trade ahead of the public dissemination of the information, this conduct by the
reporter is wrongful and should subject the reporter to insider trading liability.
This situation is similar to Carpenter, where Foster Winans, who wrote the
“Heard on the Street” column for the Wall Street Journal, tipped a broker with
Kidder Peabody to enable the broker to trade ahead of the news in Winans’s
column.370 In this case, Winans did receive a benefit because he split the trading
profits with the broker.371 But, irrespective of the fee splitting arrangement,
Winans’ conduct was wrongful because he misappropriated the information of
his employer for an improper purpose.372
In Salman, the Supreme Court noted that “the tipper benefits personally
because giving a gift of trading information is the same as trading by the tipper
followed by a gift of the proceeds.”373 The dissent in Martoma then took the
majority to task for believing that “a benefit may be imputed to a gift-giver even
367. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 75 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (quoting Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 667 (1983))
(alteration in original).
368. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 669 n.4 (1983) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
369. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 76 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
370. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 22–23 (1984).
371. Id. at 27–28.
372. Id. at 24.
373. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 428 (2016).
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when the recipient is not a friend or relative.”374 The majority in Martoma took
the position that the only question should be whether “the tip and trade resemble
trading by the insider followed by a gift of the profits to the recipient.”375
According to the dissent, the gift analogy may only be employed when the
gift-giver obtains a benefit from the gift. From this proposition, the dissent
would limit the gift analogy only to those situations where family or close
friends are involved because only there does the gift-giver receive a benefit:
Gifts to family or friends are more likely to confer a benefit upon the giftgiver because, as noted above, “to help a close family member [or friend] is
like helping yourself.” This is true for several reasons. First, a person often
benefits directly when making significant gifts to friends and relatives. A
family member who receives a new car or apartment (or even a book) might
share it with the gift-giver; similarly, providing a stock tip to a relative may
obviate the need to give the type of loan sometimes expected of close kin. A
gift-giver may also benefit because of his or her genuine enjoyment of the
recipient’s happiness. And last, the gift-giver may benefit from improved
relations with friends or relatives. When gifts pass to relatives or friends,
there is thus far greater reason than usual to believe that the gift-giver has
benefitted personally, as the same benefits rarely accompany a gift to a casual
acquaintance or a stranger.376

Now ask yourself: does this sort of analysis belong in a criminal proceeding
where a doctor, in violation of his duty of confidentiality, has disclosed material
nonpublic information to a hedge fund manager who saved hundreds of millions
of dollars by trading on the information? What business do federal courts have
in trying to ferret out the various motivations pursuant to which someone might
make a gift?
Moreover, the notion that someone cannot obtain a personal benefit from a
gift to a stranger reflects a very limited view of human nature. I get more
pleasure in buying breakfast for a homeless person on a cold winter day than I
do in giving a gift to my adult children, all of whom are well-off and more than
capable of purchasing the subject matter of the gift themselves.
The dissent also quibbled with the jury instructions because they would
permit a conviction if the doctor gave information to Martoma “as a gift with the
goal of developing . . . a personal friendship.”377 The dissent was shocked that
the government could convict someone based upon “a gift between persons who
are not friends, but might become friends.”378 Consequently, the dissent found
the instruction clearly erroneous because “whatever counts as a ‘meaningfully
close’ relationship, a non-existent friendship clearly is not one.”379 The dissent

374.
375.
376.
377.
378.
379.

Martoma, 869 F.3d at 85 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citing majority opinion at 69).
Id. at 85–86 (Pooler, J., dissenting) (citation omitted) (alteration in original).
Id. at 89 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting).
Id. (Pooler, J., dissenting).
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did not realize that developing a friendship can be as important as maintaining
one. This is rigidity carried to the extreme.
But all of this should be irrelevant. There are many reasons why a person
might give a “gift.” It is not the role of federal courts to play amateur
psychologist. It is the role of the federal courts to enforce the securities laws and
to carry out the congressional dictate that the playing field should be level.
3. Martoma II: Finessing Newman
Ten months after the Second Circuit’s opinion in Martoma I, the Second
Circuit amended that opinion in Martoma II. 380 Rather than announcing that
Newman’s requirement of a “meaningfully close relationship” was “no longer
good law,”381 Martoma II looked at the basis for such articulation in Newman,
namely, that there must be evidence of “a relationship between the insider and
the recipients that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to
benefit the [latter],”382 and determined both that there was a quid pro quo and an
intent to benefit the relationship between Dr. Gilman and Martoma.
This approach was probably taken in response to the dissent’s objection in
Martoma I that the panel could not overrule Newman without convening the
court en banc.383
The Second Circuit, in Martoma II, first observed that the Supreme Court
had “defined personal benefit broadly.”384 The court then listed the personal
benefits recognized by the Second Circuit:
We held that a jury could infer a personal benefit from the fact that a
tipper “hoped to curry favor with his boss,” and from the fact that
another tipper and the tippee “were friends from college.” We found
evidence of a personal benefit sufficient where the tippee gave one
tipper “an iPhone, live lobsters, a gift card, and a jar of honey,” and
where the tippee had another tipper admitted into an investment club
where the tipper “had the opportunity to access information that could
yield future pecuniary gain” (even though he never realized that
opportunity). In another case, we held that the government “need not
show that the tipper expected or received a specific or tangible benefit
in exchange for the tip,” and that the personal benefit element is
satisfied where there is evidence that the tipper “intend[ed] to benefit
the . . . recipient.”385
The court, in Martoma II, found both that there was a quid pro quo
arising from the thousands of dollars in consulting payments paid by
380. Martoma v. United States, 894 F.3d 64 (2d Cir. 2018) (Martoma II).
381. See Martoma, 869 F.3d at 69.
382. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 69 (“The [Newman] Court explained that this standard ‘requires evidence of a
relationship between the insider and the recipient that suggests a quid pro quo from the latter, or an intention to
benefit the [latter].” (quoting United States v. Jiau, 734 F.3d 147, 153 (2d Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
383. Martoma, 869 F.3d at 74 (Pooler, J., dissenting).
384. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 73.
385. Id. at 74. (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
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Martoma to Dr. Gilman, and that Dr. Gilman intended to benefit Martoma
with inside information.386 Relying upon Dirks, the court stated, with
respect to Dr. Gilman’s intent to benefit Martoma: “We think a jury can
often infer that a corporate insider receives a personal benefit (i.e., breaches
his fiduciary duty) from deliberately disclosing valuable, confidential
information without a corporate purpose and with the expectation that the
tippee will trade on it.” 387
To support its conclusion that Dr. Gilman intended to benefit Martoma,
the court stated:
Here, as previously noted, Dr. Gilman knew that Martoma was an
investment manager who was seeking information on which to base
securities trading decisions. And Dr. Gilman plainly understood the
valuable nature of the information about the bapineuzumab clinical
trial, as Martoma had previously paid him $1,000 per hour over the
course of 43 consultations to convey his knowledge on the subject,
and had visited Dr. Gilman in his Ann Arbor office to receive the key
drug efficacy results firsthand. From these facts, a reasonable jury
could infer that Dr. Gilman personally benefited by conveying inside
information about the trial with the purpose of benefiting Martoma,
even if it was not persuaded that the two had a relationship suggesting
a quid pro quo (or a personal relationship, for that matter). 388
Consequently, the court concluded that Martoma’s substantial rights were
not affected by a jury instruction that would have permitted him to be convicted
on the basis that Dr. Gilman tipped him in order to maintain or develop a
friendship since the evidence more than supported a conclusion that a properly
instructed jury would also have convicted him on the basis of either a quid pro
quo or intention to benefit.

V. LEGISLATION DEFINING INSIDER TRADING
In connection with both the previously discussed 1984 and 1988
legislation, Congress considered setting forth the definition of insider trading.
Senators Riegle and D’Amato received a draft of proposed legislation from a
distinguished group of securities lawyers led by Harvey Pitt, the former general
counsel of the SEC, and John Olson, the chairman of the American Bar
Association’s Task Force on Regulation of Insider Trading.389
386. Martoma II, 894 F.3d at 78.
387. Id. at 79. (citations omitted).
388. Id.
389. Letter from Donald W. Riegel, Jr., Chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on Securities, to Harvey L.
Pitt, Lawyer (Mar. 11, 1987), http://3197d6d14b5f19f2f440-5e13d29c4c016cf96cbbfd197c579b45.r81.cf1.rack
cdn.com/collection/papers/1980/1987_0311_PittRiegleT.pdf. Harvey Pitt was the SEC’s twenty-sixth Chairman
from 2001–2003 and its youngest General Counsel. He was selected as the nineteenth recipient of the William
O. Douglas Award which honors SEC alumnus who contributed to development of federal securities laws or
served the SEC community with distinction. SEC Biography: Chairman Harvey L Pitt, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM., https://www.sec.gov/about/commissioner/pitt.htm (last visited July 27, 2019). John Olson was named
Washington, DC Corporate Law Lawyer of the year in 2013 and Washington, DC Corporate Governance Law
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The proposed legislation had two critical components: trading on material,
nonpublic information would be unlawful when the trader “knows or is reckless
in not knowing” that the information has been obtained “wrongfully,” coupled
with a definition of “wrongful.”390
The unlawful aspect provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, to use material,
non-public information to purchase or sell any security, by the use of any
means or instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facilities of any national securities exchange, or of any automated quotation
system maintained for the trading of securities, if such person knows or is
reckless in not knowing that such information has been obtained wrongfully,
or if the purchase or sale of such security would constitute a wrongful use of
such information.391

What constitutes wrongful use or acquisition of information is defined as
follows: “For purposes of this section, information shall have been used or
obtained wrongfully only if it has been obtained by, or its use would constitute,
directly or indirectly, theft, conversion, misappropriation or a breach of any
fiduciary, contractual, employment, personal or other relationship of trust and
confidence.”392
In addition, the legislation would prohibit wrongful communication of
material, non-public information:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, wrongfully to
communicate material, nonpublic information to another person who,
directly, or indirectly, purchases or sells any security that is directly or
indirectly the subject of the communication, while in possession of such
information, if the person making the communication knows (or is reckless
in not knowing) that such information would be used for a purchase or sale
of a security that would violate [the above provisions].393

The key to the above provisions is that they implicitly remove the
requirement that the tippee must receive a benefit. As former SEC chairman
David Ruder pointed out, this legislation “should remove the Dirks requirement
that in tipping cases a personal benefit to the tipper must be found in order to
charge the tipper or the tippee.”394 Thus, this legislation would have reversed the
result in the Dirks case and its progeny, but was never acted on.
Congress believed that “if the Dirks is properly and narrowly construed by
the courts, the Commission’s insider trading program will not be adversely
affected.”395 As the Newman case illustrates, Dirks has been neither properly
Lawyer of the year in 2012 by The Best Lawyers in America. Biography of John F. Olson, GIBSON DUNN,
https://www.gibsondunn.com/lawyer/olson-john-f/ (last visited July 27, 2019).
390. Insider Trading Proscriptions Act, S. 1380, 100th Cong. § 16A(b)(1) (1987).
391. Id.
392. Id. § 16A(b)(2).
393. Id. § 16A(c)(2).
394. David Ruder, Chairman, SEC. & EXCH. COMM., Remarks Before the National Investor Relations
Institute: Recent Developments in Insider Trading Law and Enforcement (Nov. 11, 1987).
395. H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 15 (1983).
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construed, nor narrowly construed; rather, the Second Circuit gave a free ride to
remote tippees who made millions from the tip.
During the 2000s, insider trading again exploded,396 arguably as a result of
the rise of hedge funds and their desire to gain an edge on their competitors, a
black edge if necessary.397 In 2009, Preet Bharara was appointed U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York and promptly set out to curb insider
trading. At one point, he had 79 consecutive convictions.398
As a result of the Newman decision, Congressman Himes introduced a
bipartisan bill to define insider trading, similar to the bill introduced earlier by
Senators Riegle and D’Amato, but Himes’ bill specifically provided that
knowledge of the means by which the information was obtained or any benefit
to the tipper was not required an element of the crime:
It shall not be necessary that the person trading while in possession of such
information . . . or making the communication . . . know the specific means
by which the information was obtained or communicated, or whether any
personal benefit was paid or promised by or to any person in the chain of
communication, so long as the person trading while in possession of such
information or making the communication, as the case may be, was aware or
recklessly disregarded that such information was wrongfully obtained or
communicated.399

Congressman Himes set forth the necessity for the legislation as follows:
The absence of a clear statutory prohibition on insider trading has left us with
an amorphous body of case law instead of bright lines around what’s legal
and what isn’t . . . [t]his haziness opens the door to letting wrongdoers walk
free, and provides uncertainty to those who are genuinely trying to operate
within the bounds of the law. This isn’t a partisan issue—no one should profit
from illegally obtained information. The need for a clear definition of insider
trading is particularly important in an era in which complex trades and
information literally move at the speed of light. This legislation explicitly
defines insider trading and will help ensure that bad actors are held
accountable, protect legitimate investors and strengthen confidence and
safety in our markets. 400

According to Professor Coffee, a leading expert on securities regulation:

396. See, e.g., Peter Lattman & Azam Ahmed, Hedge Fund Billionaire Is Guilty of Insider Trading: A Circle
of Tipsters Who Shared Illicit Secrets, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011), https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/
galleon-chiefs-network-of-friendswho-tell-secrets/; Wall Street, Held Accountable: The Conviction of a Major
Hedge Fund Manager Comes at a Moment of Distrust in the Markets, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2011),
https://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/12/opinion/12thu1.html.
397. See, e.g., BLACK EDGE, supra note 274.
398. Jonathan Marino, Preet Bharara Was the Undefeated Top Cop of Wall Street—But Now His Legacy Is
in Question, BUSINESS INSIDER (Oct. 27, 2015), https://www.businessinsider.com/preet-bharara-was-once-theundefeated-top-cop-of-wall-street-but-that-has-all-changed-2015-10.
399. Insider Trading Prohibition Act, H.R. 1625, 114th Cong. § 16A2(c) (2015–2016).
400. Press Release, Himes Introduces Bipartisan Bill to Define and Prohibit Illegal Insider Trading (Mar.
25, 2015), https://himes.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/himes-introduces-bipartisan-bill-define-andprohibit-illegal-insider.
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In my judgment, Congressman Himes has performed a real service in
producing a draft bill to codify the prohibition on insider trading in a manner
that is tough, effective and fair . . . [i]t closes the loophole created by the
[Newman] decision, updates the law to cover computer hacking and other
newer forms of misappropriation, but does not overcriminalize. 401

Clearly, this legislation would clarify the concept of when trading is illegal,
by eliminating the knowledge of how the information was obtained requirement
and the personal benefit requirement. While this should not be necessary, new
legislation should also clarify that an employee of a corporation holds material
nonpublic information received in the course of employment solely for the
corporation’s benefit and would breach his or her fiduciary duty to the
corporation by any unauthorized disclosure.
Unfortunately, Congress was focused on the upcoming election and the
Supreme Court vacancy, and this legislation also did not advance.

CONCLUSION
The committee report accompanying the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of
1984 referred to Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf Sulfur as “seminal cases.”402
While Justice Powell, in Chiarella and Dirks also referred to these cases as
seminal, he not only misinterpreted these cases, but unfathomably asserted that
they held the opposite. The committee report noted that there was concern about
the Dirks decision but noted that “the Court acknowledged . . . the Dirks case
had unique facts.”403 The committee then stated that “if the Dirks decision is
properly and narrowly construed by the courts, the Commission’s insider trading
program will not be adversely affected.”404 Rather than narrowly construing
Dirks, the Second Circuit carried it to its illogical extreme in Newman.
After 1983, the lower federal courts had little choice but to follow Justice
Powell’s severely flawed analysis in Dirks. However, lower courts could have
followed Congress’s recommendation that the Dirks holding be limited to its
very unusual facts, rather than expanding the limitations upon effective policing
of insider trading. The Newman court did not limit Dirks, choosing instead to
require that the penultimate head of a “club” passing along material, nonpublic
inside information—namely, the portfolio manager who could amass tens of
millions of dollars through insider trading—must know of the benefit received
by the initial tipper—a person who breached his fiduciary duty to his employer
by disclosing the information.
The Supreme Court, in Salman, though not dealing with the massive insider
trading schemes developed by hedge funds and other large trading entities,
rejected Newman’s notion that a tipper must also receive something of a

401.
402.
403.
404.

Id.
H.R. REP. NO. 98-355, at 14 (1983).
Id.
Id. at 15.
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“pecuniary or similarly valuable nature”405 in exchange for a gift of inside
information. Building upon Salman, the Second Circuit, in Martoma II, then
determined that it was not necessary to establish Newman’s requirement of a
“meaningfully close personal relationship” between the tipper and tippee, in
order to use the gift analogy of Dirks. Rather, to meet the personal benefit
requirement, it was necessary only to establish either a quid pro quo or an intent
by the tipper to benefit the tippee.
There are several practical problems with Newman. As Sheelah Kolhatkar,
a former hedge fund analyst and later a staff writer for The New Yorker, noted,
the basic problem with Newman “is that it completely misunderstood the way
the world actually works.”406 For the Newman court, defendants’ lack of
culpability stemmed from the fact that “Newman and Chiasson were several
steps removed from the corporate insiders,” since Newman and Chiasson were
three and four levels removed from the inside tipper, respectively, “and there
was no evidence that either was aware of the source of the inside information.”407
The Newman court failed to realize that this is the way the game is played.
The portfolio manager orders trades, which make millions for the organization,
and indirectly for the analysts and others who feed information to the portfolio
manager. All of these people are aware of the risks of insider trading and, when
a dark edge is employed, want to obfuscate insider trading as much as possible.
For example, in the SAC Capital situation, Steve Cohen received reports
in a specified formant, the most important element of which was the requirement
that recommendations have a “conviction” rating from 1 to 10 as to the strength
of the recommendation:
A conviction rating of 10 was reserved for “absolute certainty,” a level that
would seem to be impossible to achieve through conventional research
methods. How could a person be 100 percent certain about any event in the
future, let alone the performance of a stock? The rating was how traders
communicated the value of their information to Cohen without exposing him
to the details of how they knew something. Cohen relied on it to decide
whether to buy for his own account. The rating system had been the idea of
the compliance department, which was always trying to ways to protect
Cohen and keep him from explicitly receiving material nonpublic
information—it was like a moat around the company’s most valuable
asset.408

It is critical for courts to understand the pressures to receive illegal
information, the chain through which it travels, where it must end in order to be
operational, and the devices to disguise the illegal sources.
Courts also need to understand that much of the world operates on
networking and relationships, and that people are motivated by factors other than
405. Salman v. United States, 137 S. Ct. 420, 425 (2016).
406. Stewart, supra note 321. Sheelah Kolhatkar is the author of BLACK EDGE, supra note 274, a three-year
study of the skullduggery that inheres in much of the hedge fund industry.
407. United States v. Newman, 773 F.3d 438, 443 (2d Cir. 2014).
408. BLACK EDGE, supra note 274, at 95.
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immediate pecuniary gain. For example, Martoma preyed on Dr. Gilman’s
loneliness and the loss of his two sons.409 Martoma, by creating a relationship
with Dr. Gilman, might have induced Dr. Gilman to provide the inside
information without any pecuniary benefit. However, in a world that is often
selfish and greedy, Justice Powell and some other federal jurists unfortunately
failed to understand that people can be motivated by something other than
money.
But there are indeed huge sums of money to be gained through the
improper use of inside information. The insider trading in Texas Gulf Sulfur,
Chiarella, and Dirks was fairly modest. The employees in Texas Gulf Sulfur
traded a few hundred to a few thousand shares.410 Chiarella realized a gain of
slightly more than $30,000 in the course of 14 months.411 And Dirks’ tippees
avoided a loss of about $6 million.412
By way of contrast, the defendants in Newman earned $72 million in profits
for their respective funds; in Martoma, the tippees realized $80.3 million in gains
and $194.6 million in averted losses.413 “Martoma personally received a $9
million bonus based in large part on his trading activity in Elan and Wyeth.”414
Today, the hedge fund industry is a $3 trillion industry in which the participants
seek any edge to enable their results to outperform their competitors.415
In 1970, daily trading volume as high as 20 million shares was unusual,
and average trading volume was about 12 million shares.416 Today, trading
volume of 3 billion shares is not unusual,417 and trading volume can range from
2 billion to 6 billion shares. If the “potential for immense profits [was] a
powerful lure” for insider trading in the 1970s and 1980s, that risk is almost
exponentially greater in today’s supercharged world.
Congress has stated that the purpose of securities regulation is to ensure a
level playing field where one participant does not have an undue advantage over
another participant. Congress also was of the opinion that a legislative definition
409. Id. at 97.
410. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 841 n.4 (2d Cir. 1968). Since the price of Texas Gulf
sulfur shares on November 8, 1963, when the drilling began was 17 3/8 and rose to a high of 37 1/8 on April 16,
1964, the day the discovery was announced, someone who purchased 2000 shares, such as Fogarty, a director,
could obtain at best $40,000 from his insider trading. Id.at 847.
411. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 224 (1980).
412. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646, 670 (1982) (“Dirks’ clients had unloaded close to $15 million of Equity
Funding stock and the price had plummeted from $26 to $15.”).
413. United States v. Martoma, 869 F.3d 58, 62 (2d Cir. 2017).
414. Id. at 62–63.
415. Christine Williamson, Hedge Fund Assets End 2017 at Record $3.2 Trillion, PENSIONS &
INVESTMENTS (Jan. 19, 2018), http://www.pionline.com/article/20180119/ONLINE/180119827/hedgefundassets-end-2017-at-record-32-trillion-8211-hfr.
416. For example, in 1970, 3.124 billion shares were traded. See Table 1210, Volume of Trading on New
York Stock Exchange: 1970 to 2010, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/
2011/compendia/statab/131ed/tables/12s1210.xls. Since there are about 252 trading days in a year, the average
daily trading volume would be about 12.4 million shares. See id.
417. See Markets Diary, WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 11, 2019), http://www.wsj.com/mdc/public/page/
2_3021-tradingdiary2.html.
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of insider trading was not necessary. That may well be the case if other federal
courts follow the lead of the Martoma court and recognize that, when a corporate
employee breaches his fiduciary duty by disclosing material, nonpublic
information outside his or her employer to someone who may trade on the basis
of such information, the person who trades on the basis of this wrongfully
obtained information is guilty of insider trading. Moreover, a market
professional who obtains material nonpublic information himself or herself has
a responsibility to know the source of such information and should not be able
to use ignorance as an excuse.
If federal courts do not have the wisdom to follow the lead of the Second
Circuit in Martoma, then Congress should act. But, in today’s politically
polarized world, acting rationally may be too much to hope for.
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